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IS THE TRANS-PACIFIC 
PARTNERSHIP'S INVESTMENT 
CHAPTER THE NEW "GOLD 
STANDARD"?  
José E Alvarez* 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership's Investment Chapter, and particularly its inclusion of investor-state 
dispute settlement (ISDS), has been the focus of considerable criticism both in the United States and 
New Zealand. Despite huge differences between these two potential TPP partners, the anticipated 
economic and political benefits offered by the pact – but also the threats to democracy posed – have 
been expressed in similar ways by distinct stakeholders in both countries. This essay describes how 
this chapter is the culmination of reforms to United States investment protection treaties that began 
with the investment chapter of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994 and that are now 
evident in the latest United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (of 2012). The TPP's 
Investment Chapter borrows heavily from prior United States efforts to narrow investor rights (as 
with respect to fair and equitable treatment), expand sovereign policy space, and incorporate 
certain rule of law reforms. For its critics, the pact falls far short of achieving a new "gold 
standard" precisely because it merely reforms – but does not abandon – ISDS for its enforcement. 
Editor's note: The text of this article was originally accepted for publication in March 2016. Recent 
statements by President-elect Donald Trump indicate that the United States will likely withdraw 
from further participation in the Trans Pacific Partnership and refrain from ratifying the agreed 
text. Without the United States' ratification, the agreement will not come into force. Despite this 
apparent ending to the Trans Pacific Partnership, the editors consider that Professor Alvarez's 
article remains an extremely useful analysis of investment provisions that may well serve as a model 
for the negotiation of such provisions in other mega-regional trade agreements in the future. 
  
*  Herbert and Rose Rubin Professor of International Law, New York University School of Law. This is an 
expanded version of a speech originally delivered at the Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand on 
8 December 2015. 
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The United States presidential candidate Hillary Clinton has answered the question posed by my 
title in two different ways. A few years ago, as United States Secretary of State, she argued that the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was the new "gold standard" in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).1 
More recently, as a presidential candidate attentive to United States Democratic Party primary 
voters, she has said that its final text reveals that it simply does not make United States workers 
better off and that she opposes its ratification. The agreement, she now says, gives United States 
workers something less than gold.2 It could be that Secretary Clinton has been talking about the TPP 
as a whole and not its investment chapter. But that is doubtful insofar as the investment chapter is 
far too integral to this agreement and, more importantly, to debates about the merits of the TPP. It is 
probably fair to say that Secretary Clinton has changed her mind about the TPP's investment 
chapter. This contribution attempts to put her quandary in context.  
Some time ago, trade and investment regimes were distinct economically and certainly legally. 
The regulation of trade in goods was governed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and state-
to-state dispute settlement, and trans-national capital flows by some 3,200 bilateral and regional 
international investment agreements. These agreements generally provided foreign investors 
protected by them with direct access to suing their host states in investor-state dispute settlements 
governed by the World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
rules or the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). Over time this 
changed. Increasingly – and especially as the WTO's capacity for generating new liberalisation 
commitments has stagnated – much of the world, including to some extent New Zealand, has turned 
to FTAs that combine trade and investment liberalisation even while keeping the forms of dispute 
settlement for each distinct. Much of the reason responds to changes in the world economy, and 
helps to explain why the TPP is a "mega-agreement" in both geographic and substantive scope. 
The TPP's investment chapter (itself over 50 pages long, including nine annexes) is only one 
chapter (of 30). It is only a part of a treaty whose mega ambitions are as vast as its economic scale.3 
According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the TPP will provide 
Americans a fair shot at the world's fastest-growing region, the place where half to two-thirds of 
world trade occurs.4 By reducing tariffs, replacing "red tape with the red carpet", enhancing secure 
payment systems, requiring state-owned enterprises to compete fairly with United States businesses, 
keeping the internet "open and free", United States businesses – including small and medium sized 
  
1  See Hillary Rodham Clinton, United States Secretary of State "Remarks at Techport Australia" (Adelaide, 
15 November 2012). 
2  Lauren Carroll "What Hillary Clinton really said about TPP and the 'gold standard'" (13 October 2015) 
Politifact <www.politifact.com>. 
3  "The Trans-Pacific Partnership" Office of the United States Trade Representative <www.ustr.gov> [TPP]. 
4  "The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Overall US Benefits" Office of the United States Trade Representative 
<www.ustr.gov>.  
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ones – will be better able to set up shop, make things, and sell them to what will be (by 2030) an 
Asian middle class of some 3.2 billion.5 New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(MFAT) is only a tad less effusive: the TPP will safeguard New Zealand's longer-term trading 
interests, enables wider regional economic integration, levels the playing field among five of New 
Zealand's top 10 trading partners, achieves greater access to the United States market for the 
country's services and increases the prospects for United States tourism and investment, while doing 
much the same with respect to TPP partners (Japan, Peru, Canada and Mexico) with which New 
Zealand did not previously have an FTA.6 
The TPP's mega scope covers market access in trade in goods, customs administration, sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures, financial services, intellectual property, labour and environment, and 
much else. Its chapter 25, which pursues the goal of regulatory convergence, will provide grist for 
administrative lawyers for years to come to the extent it shifts regulatory decision-making to global 
institutions; that chapter seeks to reduce barriers to integrating rules on such matters as the 
marketing of certain food stuffs which now hamper trade simply because they differ from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.7 That section of the treaty, along with much else including its investment 
chapter, is responsive to the emergence of an increasingly integrated international production 
system: corporate networks of foreign and domestic firms that specialise in the production of 
various parts and components eventually assembled in locations around the world.8 This is a system 
of wealth-generation based on the sale of products of mixed national parentage and increasingly 
reliant on the digital economy, along with world-wide consumer demands for cheap products. The 
TPP corresponds to a market where corporate nationality, as well as distinctions between host and 
home countries of foreign investors, lose their sharpness. These "global value chains" are often 
regionally centred, as is suggested by the TPP's focus on so-called "Asian value chains" and include 
both equity (mergers and acquisitions and greenfield investments) and non-equity arrangements 
(contracts).9 These transactions combine tangible and intangible assets (such as research and 
development (R&D) or brand names). The TPP responds in substantial part to the needs expressed 
by these value chains – where the role of corporate headquarters is more likely to be that of 
coordinating and deciding where various production activities take place. 
  
5  "The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Overall US Benefits", above n 4. 
6  New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Trans-Pacific Partnership National Interest Analysis 
(25 January 2016). 
7  See generally Richard B Stewart "State Regulatory Capacity and Administrative Law and Governance 
Under Globalization" (forthcoming, on file with author). 
8  See Karl Sauvant The Evolving International Investment Law and Policy Regime: The Way Forward  (E15 
Initiative, Geneva, January 2016). 
9  Sauvant, above n 8. 
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The TPP is, from this perspective, an agreement to reduce the costs of firms that engage in 
cross-border transactions involving both trade in goods and cross-border capital flows. As one 
knowledgeable observer put it:10  
As natural market imperfections continue to fall in the digital economy (frictionless, virtual trade), the 
barriers to trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows generated by government policies become 
more visible and important.  
The TPP seeks to harmonise regulation on everything from investment to customs, e-commerce 
to pharmaceuticals, while setting standards that supposedly will avoid races to the bottom for labour 
and the environment. This is not to suggest that the TPP is entirely about global supply chains and 
the goods these produce; some support the treaty – including many in New Zealand – principally 
because it is likely to expand the markets for old-fashioned New Zealand exports.11  
Apart from those economic drivers, the TPP also responds to geopolitics. For the current New 
Zealand government, it signals the country's leadership in the Asian region and situates the country 
as a potential conduit for reaching out to China, with which New Zealand has a FTA agreement 
incorporating many of the same investment guarantees, along with the same access to investor-state 
dispute settlement (ISDS) as exists in the TPP.12 The TPP also has the potential to facilitate the path 
towards an eventual New Zealand–European Union FTA.13 For the Obama Administration, the 
TPP, although originally proposed during the Bush Administration, concretises Obama's "tilt toward 
Asia" while simultaneously enabling leverage to convince Europe to conclude the Trans-Atlantic 
Partnership (TTIP) between the European Union and the United States. This also puts pressure on 
China to join the global marketplace on the basis of reciprocity, and provides a backup plan for 
advancing trade and investment liberalisation should either the TTIP or the United States' other 
overtures to China (such as ongoing negotiations for a United States-China bilateral investment 
treaty) fail. Not surprisingly, Secretary Clinton once called the two mega-regionals, the TPP and the 
TTIP, an "economic NATO".14 To the United States, the TPP's goal – to spread and deepen the 
  
10  Lorraine Eden Multinationals and Foreign Investment Policies in a Digital World (E15 Initiative, Geneva, 
January 2015) as cited in Sauvant, above n 8, at 14. 
11  See for example David Snell "NZ had most to gain from TPP deal" The New Zealand Herald (online ed, 
Auckland, 15 October 2015).  
12  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, above n 6. 
13  For one account of the economic benefits of that prospective agreement from a New Zealand business 
perspective see New Zealand International Business Forum "Towards a New Zealand–European Union 
FTA" (July 2015).  For a more geopolitical perspective of the benefits of closer New Zealand–European ties 
see European Commission "Statement of the Presidents of the European Council and the European 
Commission and the New Zealand Prime Minister" (press release, 29 October 2015).  
14  David Ignatius "A free-trade agreement with Europe?" The Washington Post (online ed, Berlin, 5 December 
2012) as cited in Eyal Benvenisti "Democracy Captured: The Mega-Regional Agreements and the Future of 
Global Public Law" IILJ Working Paper 2016/2 (28 March 2016), at 2. See also Clinton, above n 1.  
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capitalist marketplace – advances collective security interests no less than its global counter-
terrorism efforts. Indeed, the TPP is part of the United States' (and perhaps the world's) never-
ending war on terror.15 The current United States administration, like the ancient empire of Athens – 
which was also driven by concerns for security, material self-interest, and self-confidence to spread 
its way of life16 – sees the TPP as an essential part of "rule of law" efforts to, as Vice President 
Biden immodestly put it, "help shape the character of the global economy".17 
The TPP, and particularly its investment chapter, has not been as enthusiastically embraced 
elsewhere. For some, the TPP is part of the United States' "divide and conquer" global strategy: to 
engage simultaneously in negotiations that reduce the power of weaker trading partners in order to 
shape the world in its image. To critics like Eyal Benvenisti, the TPP and TTIP negotiations are part 
of a broader effort by the world's economic hegemon to encourage fragmentation; a turn to 
regionalism over reliance on global institutions like the WTO or those of the UN system where 
United States power is now much diminished.18 As he sees it, the two ongoing mega-regional 
negotiations pose a direct challenge to the horizontal equality of states; they pressure those 
privileged to be included as well as those excluded from each negotiation.19 Critics charge that the 
pressures also extend internally, to alternatively silence or empower distinct interests within states. 
The secrecy of the negotiations challenge democratic decision-making within the participating states 
by excluding the voices of civil society, while embracing those commercial interests included in 
state delegations whose interests are served by these treaties.20 Benvenisti and others see ISDS as 
the perfect tool for perpetuating sovereign inequality by enabling hand-picked arbitrators to displace 
national judges. To critics, ISDS is the poster child for bypassing the principal mechanism that 
democracies have for checking the power of their executive branches: namely administrative or 
constitutional courts.21  
  
15  See for example Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts  SC Res 2249, 
S/RES/2249 (2015). 
16  José E Alvarez "Contemporary International Law: An 'Empire of Law' or the 'Law of Empire'?" (2009) 24 
Am U Int'l L Rev 811. 
17  Dan Mullaney, United States Chief Negotiator "Opening Remarks by US and EU Chief Negotiators for the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) Round Nine Press Conference" (press conference, 
New York, 24 April 2015) as cited in Benvenisti, above n 14, at 3. 
18  At 4. 
19  At 4.  
20  At 5. The lack of transparency with respect to the TPP negotiations has been a recurring complaint. See for 
example Donna Miles-Mojab "TPPA Debate: We need a Free Trade of Opinions" Stuff.co.nz (online ed, 
New Zealand, 16 November 2015) <www.stuff.co.nz>; and Jane Kelsey "Govt Spin Won't Stop TPP Facts 
Emerging" The New Zealand Herald (online ed, New Zealand, 13 October 2015) <www.nzherald.co.nz>. 
21  Benvenisti, above n 14, at 6–7. See generally Gus van Harten Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). 
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The evident differences between the global hegemon, the United States, and New Zealand as 
potential TPP partners, would suggest that public reactions to the TPP, pro and con, might differ 
considerably within the two countries. In terms of the relative levels of inward and outgoing capital 
flows and stock, New Zealand has more in common with fellow TPP partners Chile, Vietnam, and 
Peru than it does with the United States.22 New Zealand's inward FDI stock and capital flows far 
  
22  According to the Treasury's Economic and Financial Overview for 2015, New Zealand was host to $97.4 
billion of foreign direct investment (FDI), and was a source of $23.2 billion of direct investment abroad. 
This is a measure of FDI stock, not of FDI flows: see Treasury New Zealand Economic and Financial 
Overview 2015 (2015) at 30. These figures are roughly similar to the 2011 figures, which stood, 
respectively, at $93.8 billion and $22.9 billion: see Treasury New Zealand Economic and Financial 
Overview 2012 (2012) at 33. FDI flows in TPP countries and direct investment abroad by TPP countries are 
as follows: 
Country: FDI inflows FDI outflows 
Brunei $568,000,000 - 
Chile $22,949,000,000 $12,999,000,000 
New Zealand $3,391,000,000 -$4,000,000** 
Singapore $67,523,000,000 $40,660,000 
Australia $51,854,000,000 -$351,000,000*** 
Canada $53,684,000,000 $52,620,000,000 
Japan $2,090,000,000 $113,629,000,000 
Malaysia $10,799,000,000 $16,445,000,000 
Mexico $22,795,000 $5,201,000,000 
Peru $7,607,000,000 $84,000,000 
United States $92,397,000,000 $336,943,000,000 
Vietnam $9,200,000,000 $1,150,000,000 
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015, Annex at 3.  
FDI Stock in and originating from TPP countries is as follows: 
Country: FDI inward stock FDI outward stock 
Brunei $6,219,000,000 $134,000,000 
Chile $207,678,000,000 $89,733,000,000 
New Zealand $76,791,000,000 $18,678,000,000 
Singapore $912,355,000,000 $576,396,000,000 
Australia $564,608,000,000 $443,519,000,000 
Canada $631,316,000,000 $714,555,000,000 
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outpace its outward flows.23 It is more of a host than a home country for FDI. At the same time, 
New Zealand has been in the past far more amenable than has the United States to supranational 
scrutiny of its laws through international adjudication. While the United States is not a party to any 
regional human rights court, the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
or the optional protocols of UN human rights treaties enabling the filing of individual human rights 
complaints to UN human rights treaty bodies, New Zealand has in force a declaration recognising 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ and is a party to at least some of the UN human rights 
optional protocols.24 It is not a party to a regional human rights court, one suspects, only because no 
Asian court exists. One could assume that New Zealanders are far more used to having their local 
laws "second-guessed" by supranational authorities. 
Yet, despite the vast differences in economic power and perhaps ideological inclinations, the 
concerns about the TPP's investment chapter and especially its recourse to ISDS are strikingly 
similar in both countries.25 In both countries many worry about lessening the scrutiny of those 
seeking to enter the country as investors. In both places many policymakers would like to be able to 
distinguish among foreign investors with respect to admission. In both, critics of free trade 
agreements would like to retain the capacity to block foreign investment with respect to certain 
sectors or enterprises or with respect to investors of some nationalities. In both places some would 
  
Japan $170,615,000,000 $1,193,137,000,000 
Malaysia $133,767,000,000 $135,685,000,000 
Mexico $337,974,000,000 $131,246,000,000 
Peru $79,429,000,000 $4,205,000,000 
United States $5,509,884,000,000 $6,318,640,000,000 
Vietnam $90,991,000,000 $7,490,000,000 
 
23  See New Zealand Economic and Financial Overview 2015, above n 22. 
24  See "Declarations recognising as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under 
Article 36, Paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court" New Zealand Treaties Online 
<www.treaties.mfat.govt.nz>. New Zealand is a party to the First Optional Protocol of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 172 (opened for signature 16 December 1966, entered 
into force 23 March 1976) [ICCPR] and the First Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman Or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 2375 UNTS 237 (opened for signature 18 
December 2002, entered into force 22 June 2006). 
25  In both countries, anti-TPP advocacy groups express similar concerns.  See for example "The Trans-Pacific 
Partnership" It's Our Future <www.itsourfuture.org.nz>; and "Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Expanded 
Corporate Power, Lower Wages, Unsafe Food" Public Citizen <www.citizen.org>. In both countries, pro-
business groups have undertaken pro-TPP efforts to counter the criticisms: see for example "TPP 
Unwrapped" Trade Works <www.tradeworks.org.nz> stressing the benefits to be "growth and jobs". 
510 (2016) 47 VUWLR 
like to retain the power to accord entry only as conditioned by certain performance requirements 
(such as achieving a certain level of exports).26 
In the United States, fears of the unrestricted entry of foreign investors have, over time, been 
prompted by waves of Japanese, Middle Eastern, and most recently, Chinese investors. In New 
Zealand, comparable fears are exacerbated by the relative amount of its much smaller economy that 
is already in foreign hands. Although the TPP leaves undisturbed New Zealand's Overseas 
Investment Act 2005 and permits the continued screening of foreign investors according to its terms, 
critics note that the Treaty seems to preclude the addition of new protected sectors that some would 
like to see, such as residential housing, at least to the extent that changes to the Act are seen as 
detrimental to foreign investors.27 
Both countries have faced criticisms with respect to specific foreign investments, particularly to 
the extent these are seen as threatening "strategic assets", variously defined. In the United States, 
controversy emerged in Congress over the contemplated Dubai Ports deal, leading to amendments to 
the national security screening mechanisms in place.28 Most recently, some members of Congress 
objected to allowing a Chinese enterprise to purchase Smithfield Farms, a leading pork producer.29 
In New Zealand, comparable doubts were expressed about the wisdom of allowing a Chinese entity, 
Shanghai Pengxin, to purchase a major farm, Lochinver Station.30 In both countries, the prospect of 
alien land ownership has been especially controversial. In New Zealand, such worries are attributed 
to a "settlement culture" that goes back to the country's origins and reflects cultural and indigenous 
rights concerns.31 Similarly, the usual United States exception from national treatment, retained in 
the TPP, that permits states of the United States to maintain restrictions on agricultural land 
holdings by aliens, also go back to the United States' founding.32 
  
26  Compare TPP, above n 3, art 9.9 prohibiting or restricting a variety of performance requirements. 
27  See generally Amokura Kawharu "The Admission of Foreign Investment under the TPP and RCEP" (2015) 
16 The Journal of World Investment & Trade 1058. 
28  Stephen Heifetz "A Brief History of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States" Steptoe & 
Johnson <www.steptoe.com>. 
29  Shihoko Goto "Why US Angst Over Chinese Buyouts is Warranted" Reuters (online ed, 27 January 2014).    
30  See for example Gerald Piddock, Aimee Gulliver and Tao Lin "Shanghai Pengxin Purchase of NZ's 
Lochinver Station Rejected by Government" Stuff.co.nz (online ed, New Zealand, 17 September 2015).  
31  See for example Kawharu, above n 27, at 1078. 
32  TPP, above n 3, annex I, sch of the United States (exception for non-conforming measures by United States 
states). See James R Mason Jr "Pssst, Hey Buddy, Wanna Buy a Country? An Economic and Political 
Policy Analysis of Federal and State Laws Governing Foreign Ownership of United States Real Estate" 
(1994) 27 Vand J Transnatl'l 453. 
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Critics of investment protection treaties in both places worry about other forms of "regulatory 
chill". In the United States, fears that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
impinges on environmental regulation reached their zenith when California's statewide restrictions 
on a gasoline additive seen as threatening drinking water were challenged by a Canadian maker of 
the additive.33 In New Zealand, many watched with alarm as Australia's efforts to enforce brown 
paper packaging for cigarettes faced an ISDS challenge.34 In both countries, there are fears that even 
the rulings of national courts can be challenged or displaced by a single investor claimant – as was 
suggested by a NAFTA claim brought to challenge a jury verdict rendered by a Mississippi court.35 
Critics in both countries point to TPP provisions that appear to go "too far" in favour of international 
arbitration, such as its provision enabling foreign investors to have recourse to arbitration even in 
the face of clause accepting the jurisdiction of national courts in an investor-state contract.36 
The concerns about the investment chapter of the TPP expressed in a letter circulated by United 
States Senator Elizabeth Warren and signed by 100 United States law professors, are similar to 
those made by some of New Zealand's legal academics.37 That letter argued that ISDS violates the 
rule of law insofar as it grants foreign corporations a special legal privilege that they will use to 
challenge government policies, actions, or decisions that merely reduce the value of their 
investments, and force these to be heard in tribunals of private lawyers that enable only foreign 
companies to sue (but not the state or anyone else hurt by corporate malfeasance). The letter also 
argued that ISDS is flawed insofar as it lacks the basic protections of national courts such as truly 
independent adjudicators and a fully-fledged appeals process.38 United States critics of ISDS, like 
their New Zealand counterparts, see it as not only an affront to sovereignty and democratic 
  
33  Methanex Corp v United States (Final Award on Jurisdiction and Merits) (2005) 44 ILM 1345. 
34  A plain packaging proposal similar to that enacted in Australia which was the subject of an ISDS challenge 
has been pending in New Zealand. See Ministry of Health "Plain Packaging" <www.health.govt.nz>. The 
Philip Morris challenge to Australia's plain packaging law was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds in 
December 2015 but that ruling remains unavailable as of February 2016: see Daniel Hurst "Australia Wins 
International Legal Battle with Philip Morris over Plain Packaging" The Guardian (online ed, London, 17 
December 2015).   
35  See Loewen Group, Inc v United States (Award) ICSID ARB(AF)/98/3, 26 June 2003. 
36  See for example Amokura Kawharu "TPPA: Chapter 9 on Investment, Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement" (2015) Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement New Zealand Expert Paper Series. 
37  Compare Letter from Alliance for Justice to Mitch McConnell (United States Senate Majority Leader), 
Harry Reid (Senate Minority Leader), John Boehner (Speaker of the House of Representatives), Nancy 
Pelosi (House of Representatives Minority Leader), and Michael Froman (United States Trade 
Representative Ambassador) regarding investor-state dispute settlement (20 April 2015), to Kelsey, above n 
20 and Jane Kelsey "Trade negotiations with EU, just as fraught as TPP" The New Zealand Herald (online 
ed, New Zealand, 5 November 2015). 
38  Alliance for Justice, above n 37.  
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governance, but as a tool to weaken the rule of law by removing procedural protections while 
turning to an unaccountable, unreviewable system of "private justice".39 
These concerns are not limited, of course, to the United States and New Zealand. European 
critics of ISDS have expressed similar concerns, even in a continent that is no stranger to submitting 
local laws to the scrutiny of international courts. Indeed, as many as 250,000 people came out in 
October 2015 on the streets of Berlin to protest the prospective TTIP.40 In response to public 
consultations by the European Commission some 150,000 comments on the TTIP's investment 
chapter were received; many expressed ire at the prospect that the TTIP might include ISDS.41 
Whether or not in response, the European Union recently tabled a proposal that would, among other 
things, replace ISDS in the TTIP with an international investment court with judges appointed for 
up to 12 years and a process for appeals.42 To many Europeans that proposal, not the TPP's old-
fashioned reliance on ISDS, constitutes the real gold standard. 
To summarise, there are five general complaints against treaties like the TPP and against ISDS: 
(1) Such treaties, and ISDS as its enforcement tool, threaten the sovereign right to regulate. 
Even the threat of an investor claim – such as the tobacco industry's investor-state claims 
against the plain packaging of cigarettes in a number of jurisdictions43 – and, of course, the 
harsh reality of arbitral awards that may set the losing state back millions of dollars, can 
prompt regulatory chill. 
(2) These agreements are not needed to make rich countries richer. Economists differ on 
whether concluding a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) or FTA actually increases the 
amount of FDI such treaty parties receive or that these treaties otherwise contribute 
positively to GDP.44 There is little evidence that, for example, the existence of these 
  
39  See for example Public Citizen NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Cases: Bankrupting Democracy – 
Lessons for Fast Track and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (September 2001). 
40  "Thousands protest in Berlin against EU-United States trade deal" Al Jazeera (online ed, Qatar, 11 October 
2015).  
41  European Commission Online Public Consultation on Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) (Brussels, 13 
January 2015) [Draft TTIP Text].   
42  For the rationales for the European Union proposal see European Commission Investment in TTIP and 
Beyond – the Path to Reform (Brussels, May 2015).  See also the discussion below at 534–536 and n 146–
155.  
43  See for example Tania Voon and Andrew Mitchell "Time to Quit? Assessing International Investment 
Claims Against Plain Tobacco Packaging in Australia" (2011) 14 J Intl Econ L 515. 
44  For one collection of studies see Karl P Sauvant and Lisa E Sachs The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct 
Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2009). For a more recent update see United Nations Conference on Trade and 
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treaties influence the decisions of CEOs on where to invest.45 It is said that CEOs go where 
the consumers or where their inputs are (for example oil or other natural resources); they go 
where the profits, not treaties, are. To some, entering into a BIT does not only fail to 
guarantee FDI flows, it can sometimes hinder them. This can happen, for example, if they 
result in adverse investor-state rulings (as against Argentina) whether or not justified on the 
merits, which send adverse signals to foreign investors waiting in the wings. 
(3) The investment regime does not help less developed countries to develop in a more holistic 
sense. It is said that even if the enactment of treaty protections for foreign investors does 
promote the entry of foreign capital (along with more favourable assessments of political 
risk by credit agencies), this does little to enhance the contribution that foreign capital may 
make to the host state or to overall improvements in the national rule of law.46 One form of 
this critique reflects a more chastened view of the merits of the ostensible model for 
economic development encouraged by strongly investor-protective treaties, such as the 
United States-Argentina BIT and others concluded in the post-Cold War euphoria of the 
1990s.47 Such treaties are seen as part and parcel of the International Monetary Fund's 
apparent turn to the trifecta of deregulation, respect for property rights, and divestment of 
state enterprises – the so called and (much maligned) "Washington Consensus" or its 
slightly reformed version, the "post Washington Consensus".48 A more extreme form of 
this critique has been expressed by Ecuador's President Rafael Correa, among others. As 
Correa put it in his 2014 Prebisch lecture, investment treaties are an open and shut case of 
neocolonialism insofar as they put the needs of capital above those of human beings, 
displace sovereign concerns with arbitration, ignore the need to exhaust local remedies 
(unlike, for example, the Inter-American system for human rights), and prevent reforms in 
favour of the public interest.49 
  
Development The Impact of International Investment Agreement on Foreign Direct Investment: An 
Overview of Empirical Studies 1998-2014 (IIA Issues Note – Working Draft, September 2014). 
45  See for example Jason W Yackee "Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? 
Some Hints from Alternative Evidence" (22 March 2010) University of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research 
Paper No 1114.  
46  See for example Yackee, above n 45. For a sceptical view of the impact of such treaties on the national rule 
of law see Tom Ginsburg "International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: bilateral investment treaties 
and governance" (2005) 25 Int'l Rev of L & Econ 107. 
47  José E Alvarez "The Evolving BIT" in Ian A Laird and Todd J Weiler (eds) Investment Treaty Arbitration 
and International Law (Juris Net, May 2010) 1 at 13–14.  
48  Alvarez, above n 47. 
49  Rafael Correa Delgado, President of Ecuador "Ecuador: Development as a Political Process" (Prebisch 
Lecture 2014, Geneva, 24 October 2014).  
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(4) ISDS violates the rule of law. Ad hoc arbitral tribunals from which there is no full scale 
appeal to correct errors of law, are said to produce inconsistent, ill-reasoned, and 
sometimes incoherent arbitral awards that fail to provide the certainty demanded by either 
investors or states.50 ISDS rulings may also be inconsistent with law produced elsewhere 
(including by UN human rights treaty bodies or regional human rights courts). Critics 
charge that ISDS case law tends to reproduce partisan and political divides that are 
replicated through repeated recourse to party-appointed arbitrators many of whom can be 
identified as either pro-investor or pro-state and not as the truly impartial judges they were 
intended to be.51 To the extent ISDS was intended to de-politicise the investor-state 
conflicts, that effort, critics charge, has failed. Rule of law critics include my New York 
University colleague Benedict Kingsbury who, as head of a scholarly movement that 
describes global forms of administrative law (or GAL), sees ISDS as a form of global 
governance desperately in need of greater transparency, participation, enhanced reason-
giving, and forms of correction or review.52 More vehement critics, like Public Citizen's 
Lori Wallach, contend that ISDS is a rigged or biased forum in favour of capital since its 
arbitrators, many of whom are arbitrators one day and claimants' lawyers the next, need to 
keep investor claimants happy to secure repeated business.53 Rule of law concerns are also 
fed by the absence of ethical rules for those involved in these disputes, as well as the 
perceived inadequacy of the rules that do exist for challenging arbitrators on the basis of 
conflicts of interest or because of evidence that they are not inclined to hear a claim 
impartially.54 These latter complaints target ICSID's outdated rules requiring those who 
challenge an arbitrator to prove a "manifest lack of qualities" and which leave decisions on 
such challenges to the challenged arbitrator's fellow arbitrators.55 The combination of an 
inappropriately demanding standard in order to disqualify an arbitrator and reliance on 
inappropriate decision-makers to undertake that judgment may explain why such 
challenges are rarely successful.56 
  
50  See for example Alliance for Justice, above n 37. 
51  See for example van Harten, above n 21. 
52  Benedict Kingsbury and Stephan Schill "Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable 
Treatment, Proportionality, and the Emerging Global Administrative Law" (2 September 2009) New York 
University School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No 09-46. 
53  Lori Wallach and Todd Tucker "Public Interest Analysis of Leaked Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
Investment Text" Public Citizen (13 June 2012) <www.citizen.org>.  
54  See generally Chiara Giorgetti "Towards a Revised Threshold for Arbitrators' Challenges Under ICSID?" 
Kluwer Arbitration Blog (3 July 2014) <www.kluwerarbitrationblog.com>.  
55  Georgetti, above n 54. 
56  Georgetti, above n 54. 
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(5) Regime reform efforts have been inadequate. The increased precision and narrowing of 
investor rights in some more recent BITs and FTAs have not eliminated the risk that 
investor-state arbitrators will second guess sovereign decisions taken in the public interest, 
such as agency decisions with respect to a private investor's involvement in water delivery 
services, health care delivery or mining. Despite reforms to restore sovereign policy space, 
states' environmental review procedures, pollution controls or safety standards continue to 
be challenged under ISDS. 
The result is substantial "sovereign backlash" against investment protection treaties like the 
TPP's investment chapter. The adverse reaction to the investment regime and to its enforcement 
tool, ISDS, is particularly evident in countries that have been respondents to investor-state 
complaints that they deem unwarranted, including Argentina (which at least under the government 
of President Kirchner refused to comply with ISDS awards), and Ecuador and Venezuela (which 
have sought to terminate BITs and/or exit from the ICSID convention).57 Many other countries, 
including the United States, have reacted with less vehemence – by striving to reform existing 
model texts for BITs/FTAs and ISDS rather than exiting both. At the same time, other countries, 
including pairs of less developed countries (LDCs), continue to conclude treaties that are as 
protective of investors' rights as those negotiated in the 1990s, when countries embraced the market 
as the only possible alternative with the end of the Cold War. The result is today's "spaghetti soup" 
of BITs and FTAs of varying complexions – where countries have reacted to opportunities to 
exercise Albert Hirschman's exit and voice options in very different ways.58 
Investment regulation – however it is undertaken and whether or not it involves ISDS – 
inevitably involves five sets of competing choices: 
(1) Tensions between the goals of global corporate capital versus those of national businesses. 
The latter will not always be in favour of an open door policy toward foreign investors, 
particularly to the extent those investors are perceived as getting better than national 
treatment, including privileged access to international arbitration. 
  
57  See generally Claire Balchin and others (eds) The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration (Kluwer Law 
International, 2010). 
58  See for example United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Recent Trends in IIAS and ISDS 
(IIA Issues Note No 1, February 2015). See also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
Reform of the IIA Regime: Four Paths of action and a Way Forward (IIA Issues Note No 3, June 2014). On 
the general concept of exit and voice as applied to the investment regime see Kathryn Gordon and Joachim 
Pohl "Investment Treaties over Time – Treaty Practice and Interpretation in a Changing World" (2015) 
OECD Working Papers on International Investment, drawing on the concept originated by Albert O 
Hirschman Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge (Mass), 1970). 
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(2) Tensions between government policies that are needed to encourage or send "positive 
signals" to foreign investors and those that are thought necessary to protect certain 
"sensitive" (or "infant" or "strategically significant") domestic enterprises.59 
(3) Tensions between policies to attract foreign capital versus policies to maximise its domestic 
benefits once it arrives in the host country.60 
(4) Tensions between a country's interest as host state to foreign capital flows versus the needs 
of home countries of investors needing to protect those investors abroad.61  
(5) Tensions between needs for harmonised transnational regulatory standards versus needs to 
preserve "policy space" in pursuit of legitimate country-specific public policy objectives.62  
These tensions or aspects of them may exist irrespective of the type of investment regulation 
that occurs; that is, irrespective of whether a country turns to investment protection treaties and 
ISDS. The tensions may be exacerbated by the legal regimes established for protecting foreign 
property rights, but these regimes do not cause them. Notably, these tensions may emerge with 
respect to either passive capital flows or foreign direct investment – even though much of the 
prominent policy debates focus only on the most prominent manifestation, in physical form, of an 
"alien" presence in a country by way of foreign mergers or acquisitions or greenfield investment.63 
Countries have generally had a love and hate relationship with FDI. Their reactions have often 
resembled Woody Allen's character in Annie Hall's memorable reaction to a restaurant: "such 
  
59  See generally Andrew T Guzman "Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties" (1998) 38 Va JIL 639. For a concrete manifestation of New Zealand's efforts 
to balance these competing goals, see for example its 38 page schedule of detailed exceptions from many 
portions of the TPP, including specific guarantees in its investment chapter. 
60  Notably, one tool that some countries use to maximize the benefits of incoming FDI, performance 
requirements, is severely restricted under the TPP: see TPP, above n 3, art 9.9. 
61  See generally Alvarez, above n 47. As noted, both New Zealand and the United States are capital exporting 
as well as capital importing states although not in the same proportion; whereas the United States remains 
the world's largest recipient of foreign capital as well as its leading capital exporter, New Zealand's 
incoming FDI vastly eclipses its outgoing capital: see Treasury, above n 22. Of course, a state that avoids all 
treaty obligations involving investments or investors and chooses to regulate only through domestic law or 
regulation could avoid making this choice, but given that some 180 countries are party to at least one 
investment protection agreement such as BIT, that policy option is not commonly available.  
62  See generally Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs and Jeffrey Sachs "Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Public Interest 
and US Domestic Law" Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (Policy Paper, May 2015). 
63  Although the TPP's definition of covered investment emphasizes that the treaty protects tangible "assets", 
see TPP, above n 3, art 9.1, many international investment treaties extend their protections to passive forms 
of investment.  Particularly after the Asian economic crisis, there was renewed attention to the risk posed by 
foreign capital flows not involving FDI, and the possibility of economic harm produced by rapidly changing 
flows of even passive capital. 
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horrible food – and such small portions".64 Countries have long sought more FDI but have also long 
had second thoughts once they received some. There is no mystery about why this is so. The 
anticipated benefits of foreign enterprises – increased competitiveness, technological spill-overs, job 
promotion, lower consumer prices, the prospect of greater economic growth and enhanced exports – 
may come in all too small portions. Worse still, these limited benefits may be accompanied by 
negative externalities, namely threats to the host state's economy, its politics and even its national 
security.65 Even countries that believe in David Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage fear that 
foreign enterprises will always be looking for other opportunities (lower wages, lower 
environmental standards) and therefore be able to extract unattractive concessions by threatening to 
leave; in the interim, they may buy up valuable assets at fire sale prices, put infant local businesses 
out of business, monopolise certain sectors, import more than they export, or refuse to provide the 
host state with the anticipated technological or knowledge spill-overs. Incoming FDI generates 
political worries. These include fears that foreign enterprises – whose economic power may dwarf a 
small country's GDP – will unduly influence or corrupt politicians, otherwise meddle in local 
affairs, violate cultural norms, disrespect the environment, or undermine domestic constituencies 
(such as the power of local labour unions). Incoming foreign enterprises may generate national 
security concerns, including fears that foreigners will end up controlling or compromising access to 
technology needed for the national defence. Such security concerns are only exacerbated when FDI 
comes in the form of state-owned enterprises or sovereign wealth funds. These forms of FDI, it is 
feared, may advance the goals of their parent states and not necessarily those of the market. 
Our love/hate relationship with foreign capital – and the policy tensions it entails – is often hard 
to disentangle from critiques of, or fears generated by, the international legal regimes constructed to 
protect it. Defenders of the TPP's investment chapter argue that the legitimate concerns about the 
negative externalities of FDI are taken care of through each of its prospective party's schedules. 
These state specific schedules include sector-specific exceptions from the treaty's guarantees of 
entry or national treatment.66 TPP critics are likely to see the treaty, including the limited exceptions 
permitted in its schedules, as being insufficiently sensitive to the needs to enhance FDI's positive 
externalities while reducing its negative ones.  
The TPP's investment chapter is in the "reform it, don't end it" mode that has been followed by 
the United States for the past 20 years, as the promises and hazards of ISDS have become clearer. Its 
  
64  Annie Hall (Film, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 1977). 
65  See Jose E Alvarez The Public International Law Regime Governing International Investment (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden (Netherlands), 2011) at 16–24. 
66  Some of the more finely grained critiques of the TPP's investment chapter question whether New Zealand's 
schedules go far enough in the direction of protecting the government's discretion with respect to the entry 
of foreign capital: see Kawharu, above n 27. 
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form and essential content follows the outlines set by the United States-Argentina BIT.67 Like that 
treaty, and United States investment treaties since, it too contains the same essential investor 
protections against discrimination, along with the "absolute" (non-relative) right of fair and 
equitable treatment (FET), free transfers, and limitations on performance requirements.68 But, like 
investment protection treaties concluded by the United States since it became a leading respondent 
state under NAFTA, with some 18 investor claims (all unsuccessful) under its belt,69 the TPP's 
investment chapter, as noted in more detail below, narrows most of the rights accorded foreign 
investors, expands the room for sovereign policy space for respondent states, and restricts the 
delegation of power accorded to investor-state arbitrators as compared to the earliest United States 
BITs. Whether one thinks that this reform-minded investment chapter constitutes a new "gold 
standard" or something a great deal less wonderful may turn on where one sits on the relative merits 
of incoming capital flows to begin with. It is also likely to turn on where priorities lie with respect to 
balancing each of the five tensions enumerated above. 
Mainstream economists, members of the United States Business Roundtable or the New Zealand 
International Business Forum respectively, and market oriented politicians (like the newly elected 
President of Argentina) are likely to see the reform-minded TPP as satisfying a new golden mean 
with respect to these tensions. Those far more sceptical of the virtues of the international 
marketplace and of the place of ISDS within it, such as President Correa of Ecuador, Professors Jane 
Kelsey or Eyal Benvenisti, dissenting economists like Jeffrey Sachs or Joseph Stiglitz of Columbia 
University, or NGO critics like Lise Johnson of the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable 
Development, see the TPP's investment chapter, as Ms Johnson has already indicated, as 
"entrenching" rather than truly reforming the "flawed" international investment system.70 In terms 
of the five tensions enumerated above, critics of the TPP's investment chapter see it as skewed in 
favour of global corporate capital, as promoting FDI at the expense of protecting national business, 
as extending protections to FDI (and FDI home states) rather than attempting to maximize the 
  
67  Treaty between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of Investment (adopted 14 November 1999, entered into force 20 October 
1999), art XI [United States–Argentina BIT]. 
68  Indeed, the TPP's limitations on performance requirements are the considerably more developed 
prohibitions contained in more recent United States treaties, rather than the extremely limited limitation 
contained in the original United States–Argentina BIT, above n 67, art II(5). This is one of the few instances 
where the TPP provides investors greater protections than were extended under early United States BITs.  
69  For a listing of the claims filed against the United States under the NAFTA, see United States Department 
of State "Cases Filed Against the United States of America" <www.state.gov>. 
70  Lise Johnson and Lisa Sachs "The TPP's Investment Chapter: Entrenching, Rather than Reforming, a 
Flawed System" Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (Policy Paper, May 2015). Those who 
express scepticism of the benefits of the TPP are likely to be critical of free trade agreements generally or at 
least of those that incorporate ISDS: see for example, Kelsey, above n 37; Joseph Stiglitz Globalization and 
its Discontents (WW Norton, New York, 2002); and Johnson, Sachs and Sachs, above n 62.  
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benefits they offer to host states, and as encouraging a race to the bottom in terms of host country 
policy space. This is what TPP critics mean when they charge the treaty with showing greater 
respect for property rights than for democratic principles or the principle of sovereign equality.  
One's stance towards the TPP may turn on whether one is, by nature or nurture, disposed to be a 
"little Conservative" or a "little Liberal."71 But whether one thinks the TPP's investment chapter is 
the gold standard may also be the product of expectations. If one expected the TPP negotiations to 
produce a state of the art investment treaty, that goal was achieved. The TPP is the latest thing in a 
traditional investment protection treaty. As is further elaborated below, it is the latest word in treaty 
texts that have gone from the exceptionally strong investor rights of the United States Model BITs 
of 1984 and 1987 to the more complex regional package deals struck by the three NAFTA parties to 
the more "sovereign-sensitive" provisions of the United States Model BIT of 2012 and 
contemporary United States FTAs.72 NAFTA trimmed some investor rights and restored the 
capacity of the state parties to re-examine those rights through joint "commission" interpretations 
binding on investor-state arbitrators.73 The more cautionary stance taken in NAFTA – the first 
investment protection treaty concluded between two capital exporting nations – began a process of 
adaptation in United States investment protection agreements as the United States encountered 
challenges brought by Canadian investors under NAFTA and in response to other ISDS rulings 
involving other states. The TPP replicates many of the provisions of the latest generation of United 
States (and to some extent Canadian) investment protection treaties. Its contents reflect that of the 
2004 and 2012 United States Model BIT texts and treaties concluded under their influence, 
including the investment chapters of recent United States FTAs.74 Some of these textual changes 
have appeared in New Zealand's investment treaties prior to the TPP, such as the Protocol on 
Investment to the New Zealand–Australia Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement.75 But that 
agreement did not include ISDS and also included some tweaks that are reminiscent of provisions 
  
71  See William Schwenck Gilbert and Arthur Seymour Sullivan Iolanthe (Opera, 1882): "I often think its 
comical … /How Nature always does contrive … /That every boy and every gal/That's born into the world 
alive/ Is either a little Liberal/Or else a little Conservative". For a more intellectual exploration of how 
"nature" may influence ideology, see for example Alford Hibbing Predisposed: Liberals, Conservatives, 
and the Biology of Political Differences (Routledge, Abingdon-on-Thames, 2013).  
72  Alvarez, above n 47. 
73  At 10. 
74  At 9–12 and Annex A (table comparing the 1984 and 2004 United States BITs).  For the text of the 2004 
United States Model BIT see <www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf>. For the text of the 
2012 United States Model BIT see <www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf>. 
75  Protocol on Investment to the Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (signed 
16 February 2011).  
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found in the European Union–Canada FTA, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA).76 
The annex to this essay, containing recent iterations of the FET clause, illustrates how much the 
TPP's investment chapter owes to post-NAFTA United States treaty practice. As investment lawyers 
recognise, the FET clause is the heart of most investment protection treaties and perhaps the 
investment regime as a whole. Nearly all investment protection agreements have an express 
reference to FET and indeed, to the extent FET is considered part of customary international law, all 
treaties that include a reference to protecting investors "under international law" might be deemed to 
include this right. The FET guarantee has become more important in practice as states have turned 
away from the outright nationalisations and expropriations which once upon a time constituted the 
core risks faced by foreign investors. FET is, in addition, the treaty guarantee that is the most 
invoked by investors and, most importantly, is the most likely to be successful on their behalf.77 
While references to "fair and equitable treatment" date back centuries, that guarantee did not receive 
sustained attention from adjudicators until investor-state claims began being heard in significant 
numbers starting in the late 1990s.78 Today, with some 600 investor-state arbitral claims either 
being heard or already decided, this provision has drawn prominent attention at the highest levels of 
government. 
Of course, FET may be of use to an investor even if a treaty does not include it, but another 
investment treaty concluded by the host state does, and the investor has the right to claim FET 
protection through the magic of a most favoured nation treatment clause.79 In addition, in some 
treaties, like the United States–Argentina BIT quoted in the annex, there is a reference to FET in a 
treaty's preamble as well as its substantive text.80 A preamble's FET reference may facilitate a 
finding by an arbitrator that this guarantee is part of a treaty's essential object and purpose. It may 
encourage a finding that the good faith interpretation of the treaty's object is to provide investors 
with fair treatment; it may enable interpretations that in case of ambiguity the question should be 
  
76  Government of Canada "Canada-European Union: Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA)" <www.international.gc.ca>. As noted below, this CETA text, released in February 2016, now 
replaces resort to ISDS with an international investment court comparable to that proposed by the European 
Union in the on-going negotiations for the Trans-Atlantic Partnership: see arts 8.23–8.31.  
77  See Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer Principles of International Investment Law (1st ed, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2008) at 119–149. 
78  See Martins Paparinskis The International Minimum Standard and Fair and Equitable Treatment (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2013). 
79  For the role of the most favoured nation clause in "multilaterialising" the international investment regime, 
see Stephan Schill The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2009) at 121–196. 
80  United States–Argentina BIT, above n 67, preamble, at [4]. 
 IS THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP'S INVESTMENT CHAPTER THE NEW "GOLD STANDARD"? 521 
 
 
resolved in favour of protecting investments and investors.81 For these and other reasons, the 
meaning of FET has often featured prominently in debates about the merits of the international 
investment regime. 
To proponents of these treaties and to investor claimants the FET clause is useful because of its 
flexibility. Indeed, some have suggested that the FET provision provides invaluable gap-filling 
protection to an investor who fails to convince a tribunal that he or she has been the victim of 
discriminatory treatment or an expropriation. But to critics of the investment regime, this is 
precisely the problem: a reference to FET provides an imprecise right to foreign investors that 
simultaneously provides little guidance to state regulators, delegates considerable "law-making" 
power to creative investor claimants and arbitrators, and enables foreigners to claim protections not 
available to national investors under national law.82 
As the annex illustrates, the FET provision has evolved over time, even with respect to the 
limited treaty parties reflected in that annex. Indeed, it is probably the investment guarantee that, at 
least in United States investment treaty practice, has changed the most over the past 20 years, with 
the United States' much altered expropriation provision being a close second.83 The FET guarantee 
is an absolute right in the sense that it does not require comparison to how a domestic investor is 
treated. Proving an FET violation does not require a showing of discriminatory treatment, but much 
else about FET has generated debate among scholars and arbitrators. Tomes have been written on 
alternative interpretations of this seemingly simple phrase.84 This essay limits itself to the following 
five illustrative possibilities.85 
(1) FET means only those guarantees that customary international law extends under the 
minimum standard of treatment of aliens. On this view, FET tends to be equated with the 
right to procedural due process; that is, a violation of FET requires a denial of justice. This 
is the minimalist view of FET accepted even by tribunals that reject variations 2–5 below. 
However, substantial debates have ensued about what constitutes a contemporary denial of 
justice or violation of the international minimum standard. 
(2) FET may include, in addition to (1) above, a host state's violations of its other international 
legal obligations. This would mean that if a host state can be shown to be violating the 
WTO's rules in its treatment of a foreign investor, that violation can be the subject of an 
  
81  See generally Dolzer and Schreuer, above n 77, at 122. 
82  See for example Van Harten, above n 21, at 86–90. 
83  See generally Alvarez, above n 47. 
84  See for example Paparinskis, above n 78.  
85  For a fuller discussion, see Alvarez, above n 65, at 177–246. 
522 (2016) 47 VUWLR 
ISDS claim (as well as possibly a WTO claim to the extent the investor's home state wishes 
to pursue it). 
(3) Whether or not one accepts (2) above, a violation of FET may emerge from a host state's 
violations of its own law. Tribunals that take this view may do so on the premise that 
violations of a state's own law violates the legitimate expectations of investors, or on the 
premise that a host state that violates its own law is presumptively not acting in good faith. 
On this view, FET becomes a substantive guarantee and not only a procedural one. 
(4) FET requires consideration of whether a host state has treated an investor fairly along with 
a distinct inquiry about whether it has treated the investor equitably. Violations of either are 
not restricted to departures from a host state's national or international obligations. On this 
view, the FET clause is a de facto delegation of authority to arbitrators to determine the 
relative equities on both sides, including consideration of whether a host state or an 
investor is otherwise acting in good faith. 
(5) Reference to FET as such does not have a single core meaning. The meaning and scope of 
this guarantee varies depending on the treaty text, including the context of the provision, 
the negotiating history of the particular treaty and all the other factors authorised under the 
traditional rules for treaty interpretation.  
While (1) above has been the most common formulation of FET among arbitrators and scholars, 
it has not displaced (5); that is, an FET clause that includes, apart from a bare reference to fair and 
equitable treatment, other language is likely to be interpreted in light of that context.  This is 
certainly the operating assumption of those who drafted the FET clauses contained in the annex, 
including the TPP's. 
The United States–Argentina BIT text, based on the United States Model BITs of 1984 and 
1987, quoted in the annex, provides the most investor-protective formulation of FET in United 
States treaty practice. Under this clause, FET is a distinct additional right accorded to investors, 
above and beyond "full protection and security" and any entitlements under international law. This 
formulation of the right to FET does not equate it with customary international law or even with a 
state's other international obligations, but situates the right in a complex web of additional investor 
rights, including rights to be free of "arbitrary and discriminatory measures" as applied to a wide 
range of activities (management, operation, and so on) associated with an investment (and not just 
the direct decision to invest). In this treaty, the right to FET is also embedded in a clause that also 
compels states to "observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments", an 
ostensible umbrella clause whose wide scope would appear to embrace a state's contracts entered 
into with investors but which may also embrace other representations made by a state to investors 
whether contained in licenses, oral statements, or perhaps the state's general laws or international 
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commitments.86 Not surprisingly, this formulation of FET, in context and interpreted in light of the 
ejusdem generis canon of construction, can easily be treated as designed to protect investors' 
legitimate expectations. Such expectations are, after all, the apparent rationale connecting the 
various rights enumerated alongside the right to FET.87 
By contrast, the FET clause in the Argentina-Australia BIT of 199588 in the Annex is the 
simplest, insofar as it says nothing about the possible connections between FET and other parts of 
international law, customary or otherwise, and provides no other helpful context at least within the 
FET clause itself. Without more, this clause is not necessarily more solicitous in terms of protecting 
the host state's regulatory space. Indeed, its simplicity provides arbitrators, particularly those not apt 
to adhere to prior arbitral rulings on point, with the most discretion. When FET stands alone, as in 
this text, arbitrators charged with interpreting and enforcing it have, at least in theory, all five 
interpretative possibilities surveyed above to choose from. 
But the 1994 NAFTA version of the FET clause in the annex cabins that discretion in one 
respect: it affirms that investors must be treated "in accordance with international law" and indicates 
that international law includes the FET guarantee. This phrasing appears to suggest that FET is not 
some self-standing right apart from general international law (including the international minimum 
standard of treatment) but is part and parcel of international law. Since at least one NAFTA arbitral 
tribunal was not convinced that NAFTA drafters intended to cut back so dramatically on the FET 
right that at least one of NAFTA parties had previously concluded, on July 31, 2001 the NAFTA 
parties released their joint interpretation of NAFTA's FET clause, quoted in the annex.89 
  
86  Notably, this formulation does not clarify whether the clause protects investors only with respect to specific 
representations made by states to specific investors or whether general representations should be included in 
the duty to observe any obligation.  It also seems to protect all types of assurances "entered into" by a host 
state and a foreign investor and not only the investment authorizations and investment agreements 
contemplated by the TPP's art 9.1. For a review of the interpretation of such umbrella clauses see Andrew 
Newcombe and Luís Paradell Law and Practice of Investment Treaties (Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague, 2009) at 437–479. 
87  See generally Dolzer and Scheuer, above n 77, at 133–140. 
88  Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Argentine Republic on the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments [1995] ATS 4 (signed 23 August 1995, entered into force 11 
January 1997). 
89  See NAFTA Free Trade Commission "Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions" Nafta 
Claims (31 July 31 2001) <www.naftaclaims.com>. For a concise account description of the evolution of 
this interpretation and its effect on a pending NAFTA case see David Gantz "Pope & Talbot Inc v Canada" 
(2003) 97 AJIL 937.   
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This controversial Commission Interpretation, binding on NAFTA investor-state arbitrators, has 
been criticised as an unauthorised amendment of NAFTA and not a mere clarification.90 Whether or 
not it was a faithful interpretation of NAFTA's FET clause, it undoubtedly narrowed the 
interpretation of the FET guarantee from that as provided under prior United States BITs, including 
the United States–Argentina BIT. The Commission Interpretation, which as the annex indicates, 
influenced subsequent versions of the FET clause in United States treaties (and indeed the treaty 
texts of some other BIT parties, including China's),91 states that FET prescribes the international 
minimum standard of treatment under customary law. It also indicates that violations of other 
treaties (including other parts of NAFTA itself) do not "establish" a breach of FET.92  
By the time the United States drafted its 2004 Model BIT three years later, the minimum 
standard of treatment became the title for the old FET clause. As the annex indicates, the 2004 
Model incorporates NAFTA's formulation of FET in its first paragraph, but goes on to clarify, "for 
greater certainty", that neither FET nor full protection and security extend any greater rights than 
that accorded under the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens, and 
that FET "includes" denial of justice "in accordance with the principle of due process". Finally, the 
2004 Model incorporates into its text the final part of the NAFTA Commission Interpretation from 
2001, indicating that breaches of other treaties does not establish a breach of this provision. In 
response to suggestions in several NAFTA arbitral rulings that the customary international law 
minimum standard has evolved (while relying on prior arbitral rulings in support), the 2004 Model 
goes a step further and includes an annex purporting to confine the meaning of "customary 
international law" and specially of "the international minimum standard of treatment of aliens". The 
former is stated to result from state practice followed by a sense of legal obligation. The latter 
protect the "economic rights and interests of aliens". 
Prior United States FET clauses explain nearly every aspect of the TPP's FET provision. Like 
the 2004 United States Model BIT, the TPP's equivalent provision, at art 9.6, is now entitled 
"minimum standard of treatment". Its first paragraph duplicates the NAFTA provision on point, as 
well as the first paragraph of the 2004 Model. Its second and third paragraphs replicate the second 
and third paragraphs of the 2004 Model. In addition, the TPP's annex on customary international law 
  
90  See for example Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler "Interpretive Powers of the Free Trade Commission and the 
Rule of Law" in Emmanuel Gaillard and Frédéric Bachand (eds) Fifteen Years of NAFTA Chapter 11 
Arbitration (Juris Publishing, Huntington (NY), 2011). 
91  See Alvarez, above n 47, at 12. 
92  Some arbitral tribunals have nonetheless permitted investors to argue that a host state's violations of its other 
treaties, including WTO commitments, is a relevant consideration in determining that a violation of FET 
occurred even though such violations do not alone "establish" that the FET obligation has been breached. 
This may be the case where a tribunal believes that it protects the investors' legitimate expectations to be 
treated in accordance with the host state's national and international legal obligations. See for example 
Newcombe and Paradell, above n 86, at 285.  
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replicates, with one minor deviation, the comparable definitional annex from the 2004 Model. The 
only departure from the prior United States text in that annex is that the international minimum 
standard of treatment of aliens now includes "all customary international law principles that protect 
investments of aliens", a circular definition that seems to be broader than the original United States 
text insofar as it is not limited to the "economic interests of aliens" (but may be narrower depending 
on what is meant by rights that protect "investments of aliens").93 
The one clear departure in the TPP is art 9.6(4), which uses the familiar United States phrase 
"for greater certainty" to introduce a limitation that was certainly not clear in either prior FET 
clauses or the majority of arbitral rulings on point. Article 9.6(4) seems to be saying that the 
violation of an investor's expectations cannot be the only reason ("the mere fact") for finding a 
breach of FET, even if violating those expectations causes tangible loss or damage. This poorly 
worded clause has not appeared in prior United States Model texts and appears to be responsive to 
provisions like that in the CETA text provided in the annex, at art 8.10(4). The CETA text seeks to 
limit the scope of legitimate expectations as deployed by some arbitral tribunals. It clarifies that only 
specific representations by a host state (as in a contract) that actually induces an investor to invest 
and on which the investor relies can be taken into account. The TPP's comparable clause takes the 
opposite tack: it purports not to define the scope of legitimate expectations but to modify the 
relevant evidentiary burdens, but only with respect to "expectations" (which are not defined or 
clarified). Subject to this exception, the TPP's FET clause appears to be the latest iteration of that 
clause in the United States' most recent treaties. 
In following this path, the negotiators of the TPP rejected some alternatives suggested by the 
CETA text set out in the annex. The CETA equivalent provision does not equate FET to customary 
international law or the international minimum standard and does not purport to define these terms. 
It provides, on the other hand, a closed list of what constitute FET breaches in art 8.10(2)(a)–(f) that 
might be seen as designed to narrow the interpretative discretion accorded to arbitrators. By 
contrast, the TPP includes, consistent with prior United States practice, only the first item (2)(a) 
from the CETA text, namely denials of justice, but suggests that other kinds of FET breaches may 
exist that it does not enumerate. Those looking for a narrower version of the FET guarantee might 
prefer the CETA's alternative to the open-endedness of the TPP's art 9.6(2)(a). On the other hand, 
the CETA enumeration at art 8.10(2)(a)–(f), notwithstanding some efforts to cabin breaches that 
might have been included under the expansive United States–Argentina BIT (for example, 
restricting investors to bringing claims only for "manifest" arbitrariness), includes some very 
expansive possibilities, such as "abusive treatment of investors". Whether the CETA's FET clauses 
actually closes the door on expansive interpretation remains to be seen.  
  
93  It is not clear whether this broader language is intended to extend protection to, for example, the human 
rights of aliens.   
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At the same time, as the CETA text indicates, the TPP is not alone in following a path initially 
blazed by the United States, including in its NAFTA practice. The CETA's closed list at art 
8.10(2)(a)–(f) appears to be an effort to codify the most cited paragraph from a NAFTA ruling, 
Waste Management v Mexico.94 The CETA text also adopts the NAFTA's innovation of re-
introducing a role for its state parties in defining, from time to time, the meaning of the FET 
guarantee in para 3, while para 6 essentially replicates art 5(3) from the 2004 United States Model. 
There are many other examples in the TPP of provisions that either reflect or even go beyond 
more recent United States treaty practices in order to re-calibrate the balance of investor rights 
versus state's right to regulate. The TPP's definition of investment narrows the property rights that it 
protects by making clear that only tangible assets involving a commitment of capital entailing an 
assumption of risk can be included.95 The TPP also narrows nearly all of the substantive protections 
accorded to foreign investors from the high point of those protections (as under the United States–
Argentina BIT), apart from FET. While the right to national and most favoured nation (MFN) 
treatment extends to the right of entry, the TPP permits individual TPP parties to opt out of ISDS 
with respect to such claims and, thus far, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Mexico have all 
decided to do so.96 As with United States treaties after NAFTA, the umbrella clause extending 
protections for "obligations" entered into by host states, originally part of the FET obligation in the 
United States-Argentina BIT, has been replaced by a more limited obligation that permits investors 
to bring claims for breaches of "investment authorizations" and some "investment contracts" with 
TPP party states.97 The TPP's national treatment protection clarifies that consideration of whether a 
foreign investor is denied such treatment turns on an examination of "the totality of the 
circumstances, including whether the relevant treatment distinguishes between investors or 
investments on the basis of legitimate public welfare objectives" and not a more mechanical 
  
94  Waste Management Inc v United Mexican States (Award) ICSID ARB(AF)/00/3, 30 April 2004 at [98]. 
95  TPP, above n 3, s 9.1 (definition of investment). This nods to the "Salini factors" developed in investor-state 
case law which attempted to restrict the meaning of protected investment for purposes of the ICSID 
Convention: see for example Dolzer and Schreuer, above n 77, at 60–71. This definition can be compared to 
the comparable provision in the United States–Argentina BIT which provided only a general circular 
definition of investment ("investment means every kind of investment"), without reference to "asset", 
"commitment of assets" or "assumption of risk": see United States–Argentina BIT, art 1(a). The TPP also 
suggests that mere contracts for the sale of goods are "less likely" to have the characteristics of investment 
at n 2.  
96  TPP, above n 3, annex 9-H. 
97  Article 9.1 defining both "investment authorizations" and "investment agreements" with the latter limited to 
contracts with a TPP host state in relation to the exploitation of natural resources, the operation of public 
utilities, and government procurement; and art 9.18(1) permitting investors to bring claims for breaches of 
investment authorizations and agreements.   
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approach to interpreting whether a foreign and national investor are in "like circumstances".98 Its 
MFN treatment provision does not encompass dispute settlement procedures or mechanisms, 
thereby preventing investors from claiming more beneficial provisions on ISDS extended in TPP 
parties' prior treaties.99 Beyond the limitations on FET discussed earlier, that guarantee does not 
extend to some forms of restructured public debts which can be subject to an investor claim only if 
discriminatory treatment is shown.100 
The TPP's guarantee of prompt, adequate and effective compensation upon expropriation is 
essentially derived from the United States' most recent iterations of this provision. It includes, in 
Annex 9-B, a considerable narrowing of the potential for claims based on regulatory or indirect 
takings of property, including a requirement of case-by-case balancing of three factors drawn from a 
famous United States Supreme Court case and a clarification, indicating, "for greater certainty", that 
non-discriminatory regulatory actions taken for legitimate public welfare objectives do not, "except 
in rare circumstances", constitute indirect takings.101 But it also adds to those assurances of greater 
policy space, clarifications not previously reflected in United States treaty practice.102 
As do recent United States treaties, the TPP discourages some forms of "nationality" or "treaty-
shopping" by specifying that its benefits do not extend to those enterprises which have only a paper 
presence in the other TPP treaty party, that is, have "no substantial business activities" in another 
TPP party state other than the party against which a claim is brought.103 In accordance with post-
  
98  Article 9.4 and n 14. This goes beyond the United States Model BIT of 2012, above n 74, which has no such 
clarification or limitation. 
99  TPP, above n 3, art 9.5(3). This takes a more a narrower approach to the MFN than had been taken by some 
arbitral tribunals: see Dolzer and Schreuer, above n 77, at 253–257. 
100  TPP, above n 3, annex 9-G, at [2]. 
101  Annex 9-B. This is a response to considerable ambiguity arising with respect to the handling of prior 
"regulatory takings" by prior ISDS tribunals, including widespread dissatisfaction with the dicta expressed 
in NAFTA's Metalclad ruling and a desire, by United States treaty drafters, to return to the security provided 
under the leading United States Supreme Court authority on takings: see, for example Dolzer and Schreuer, 
above n 77, at 92–106 and 109–114. The three factor test contained in the TPP's annex 9-B, at [3(a)(i)-(iii)] 
is taken from the famous ruling interpreting the "takings clause" of the United States Constitution rendered 
by the United States Supreme Court in Penn Central v City of New York 438 US 104 (1978).  
102  It ties the concept of "public purpose" to customary international law: see TPP, above n 3, art 9.7 and n 17. 
It also indicates that the second factor in the three factor test applicable to indirect takings, which requires 
examining whether an investor's investment-backed expectations are "reasonable", depends on "whether the 
government provided the investor with binding written assurances and the nature and extent of 
governmental regulation or the potential for government regulation in the relevant sector": see TPP, above n 
3, annex 9-B and n 36. The TPP also adds considerable detail to what may constitute permissible regulatory 
actions to protect public health: see TPP, above n 3, annex 9-B and n 37. 
103  TPP, above n 3, art 9.14(1)(b). For discussion of the treaty-shopping risks that this clause seeks to address 
see for example Dolzer and Schreuer, above n 77, at 49–52.  
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NAFTA United States treaty practice, the TPP includes a clause permitting states to take 
environmental, health or other regulatory measures "otherwise consistent" with its investment 
chapter, but goes beyond United States prior practice by including another clause that reaffirms the 
importance of each party "encouraging" the adoption of corporate codes of social responsibility.104 
The TPP also borrows heavily from the United States treaty toolkit with respect to fixing the 
alleged rule of law flaws of ISDS. It anticipates that respondent states may file certain 
counterclaims,105 requires claimants to state the basis of their claims from the outset,106 requires 
claims to be brought within three years and six months of the alleged breach,107 anticipates the 
acceptance of amicus briefs by investor-state arbitrators,108 provides an expedited process for the 
handling and prompt dismissal of frivolous claims as well as those challenging jurisdiction,109 
clarifies that the burden of proof rests on the investor with respect to proving all elements of its 
claim,110 adopts a WTO-inspired procedure enabling the litigants to get a "first look" at the draft 
arbitral award prior to its issuance,111 anticipates that the TPP parties may establish an appellate 
mechanism,112 requires transparency with respect to all documents filed in the course of investor-
state arbitration,113 requires ISDS arbitrators to respect any binding interpretations of the treaty 
issued by the TPP parties,114 permits the disputing parties to consolidate claims that share a 
common question of law or fact,115 and imposes limits on damages with respect to claims alleging 
denial of entry.116 In a departure from prior United States treaty practice and presumably responding 
  
104  TPP, above n 3, arts 9.16 and 9.17. Interestingly, both of these articles are included in section A of the 
investment chapter which means that they are subject to investor-state dispute settlement under art 9.18.  
105  Article 9.19(2).  
106  Article 9.19(3). 
107  Article 9.21(1). 
108  Article 9.23(3). 
109  Articles 9.23(4) and (5). It also provides the arbitrators with the option of awarding the prevailing party 
costs in such proceedings: see art 9.32(6).  
110  Article 9.23(7). This provision had not previously appeared in United States treaty practice. 
111  Article 9.23(10). 
112  Article 9.23(11). 
113  Article 9.24. In a further departure from prior United States treaty practice, the transparency requirements 
now extend to any available minutes or transcripts of the hearings of the tribunal: see art 9.24 (1)(d).  
114  Article 9.25(3). 
115  Article 9.28. 
116  Article 9.29(4) requiring that any the only damages that may be awarded in such cases be limited to those 
that the claimant proves were sustained in the attempt to make the investment and proximate to the breach.  
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to criticisms of ISDS with respect to the current handling of challenges to arbitrators, the TPP 
anticipates that its state parties will "provide guidance on the application" of a Code of Conduct for 
Dispute Settlement Proceedings.117 The TPP also narrows the scope of ISDS in other respects, 
including by permitting state parties to opt out of it altogether with respect to claims arising from 
their tobacco control measures.118 The TPP also includes the latest versions of United States general 
exceptions from the provisions of the investment chapter, including an exception for measures that 
parties "consider necessary for fulfilment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or 
restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security 
interests".119 
As the above summary suggests, the TPP's investment chapter largely replicates recent United 
States treaty practice. A recent comparison of treaty texts by two scholars, finding that that 82 per 
cent of the text of the TTP's investment chapter is taken from the United States-Colombia FTA's 
investment chapter (and that the TPP's investment chapter text has a 60 per cent similarity with 
NAFTA's), strongly supports this conclusion.120 Of course, assuming this linguistic analysis is 
correct, 18 per cent of the TPP's investment chapter does not replicate recent United States practice 
and those differences could prove determinative with respect to winning and losing prominent 
investor claims.121 
It is impossible to predict whether the TPP's investment chapter will, should it go into effect 
unchanged, lead to eventual case law comparable to that produced to date under NAFTA or other 
treaties with similar or even identical provisions. Much will depend on the claims brought, the 
arbitrators selected, as well as matters that are not yet clarified in the existing text (such as the 
contents of the anticipated Code of Conduct for arbitrators).122 The parts of the investment chapter 
  
117  Article 9.22(6). 
118  Article 29.5 on tobacco control; and art 29.4 requiring pre-screening by the respective Party's tax authorities 
for claims claiming expropriation based on tax measures. As noted, a side letter to the TPP also ensures no 
ISDS as between the investors of Australia and New Zealand.  
119  Article 29.2. Other exceptions permitted include "temporary safeguard measures" on transfers of capital (art 
29.3), and measures deemed necessary by New Zealand to fulfil the Treaty of Waitangi (art 29.6). In 
addition, the TPP's Financial Services Chapter includes exceptions taken for "prudential" reasons to, among 
other reasons, "ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system" as well as non-discriminatory 
measures in pursuit of monetary or exchange rate policies: see TPP Financial Services Chapter, art 
11.11(1)–(2).  
120  Wolfgang Alschner and Dmitriy Skougarevskiy "The New Gold Standard? Empirically Situating the TPP in 
the Investment Treaty Universe" (23 November 2015) The Graduate Institute of International and 
Development Studies <www.repository.graduateinstitute.ch>. 
121  Indeed, one critic of the significance of the 82 per cent finding has pointed out that chimpanzees and 
humans share 98 per cent of the same DNA but that two per cent in that instance makes all the difference. 
122  See TPP, above n 3, art 9.21(6). 
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that do not draw from United States practice – such as its language under FET concerning the 
meaning of legitimate expectations, its statement that MFN does not apply to dispute settlement, or 
its provision on corporate social responsibility – may prove to have considerable impact. 
The TPP also appears to leave more room than prior United States BITs or FTAs for each of its 
state parties to make exceptions to its terms, and this too may have a considerable impact on 
whether it will generate the sovereign backlash against ISDS that has been evident elsewhere. The 
TPP's parties have considerable options, for example, with respect to how to deal with their own 
prior investment protection treaties and whether, for example, investors under the TPP will be able 
to enhance their rights by drawing from any better treatment accorded to others in these older 
treaties through MFN.123 This scope for discrete party exceptions even applies, as noted, with 
respect to whether tobacco control measures will be subject to investor challenge through ISDS. To 
the extent the TPP does not avoid overlap with the 35 investment agreements, including NAFTA, 
concluded among a subset of TPP parties, it is likely to encourage, not eliminate, the prospect of 
forum shopping, resorts to MFN or normative conflicts among these treaties.124 
For this reason, it is not clear that the TPP is likely to harmonise global investment standards 
and thereby facilitate the conclusion of a multilateral investment treaty.125 At the same time, thanks 
to the TPP, three pre-existing investment treaties, between Australia and Japan, Malaysia and the 
United States respectively, which did not originally have ISDS, would, if the TPP comes into effect, 
provide investors from those countries access to ISDS. Although, as noted, Australia and New 
Zealand's FTA from 2011 will not be affected, given those two countries decision to opt out of the 
TPP's ISDS as between themselves, the TPP is still a significant departure from Australia's recent 
practice with respect to ISDS (at least with respect to Australia's relations with the other TPP 
partners apart from New Zealand).   
It is also possible that given the exceptions from the investment chapter taken by the 12 TPP 
parties individually, the TPP will not produce the extent of investment liberalisation among its 
parties that some proponents of the treaty anticipated. And yet, the text of the investment guarantees 
accorded in the TPP that remain subject to ISDS cannot be described as lowest-common 
denominator investor rights. Although the TPP narrows most investor guarantees as compared to the 
high point of early United States BITs, that narrowing lies within the parameters of the generally 
high standards of investment protection that have historically characterised United States treaty 
practice. This is a treaty that accords foreign investors absolute rights (for example FET, full 
protection and security, compensation for direct expropriations, bans on multiple performance 
  
123  See for example Alschner and Skougarevskiy, above n 120, at 21–24. 
124  At 21–24. 
125  At 26–28. 
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requirements, and free transfers of capital) and relative rights (for example national and MFN 
treatment), while also responding at the margins to arbitral decisions that have alarmed host states. 
The TPP's investment chapter is a relatively balanced instrument for a reason. It is, after all, a 
treaty concluded among states that experience, for the most part, bidirectional investment flows 
even if in some instances (as with respect to New Zealand) those flows are disproportionately 
inward directed. It should not surprise anyone that the TPP seeks to balance the needs of capital 
exporters desiring to protect the rights of their investors abroad with the needs of capital importers 
which, as host states, still need to be able to regulate to protect the public interest.126 The TPP's 
investment chapter converges around high United States standards for investment protection, host 
state flexibility, and investor-state arbitration.127 That trifecta is not achieved in the broader universe 
of investment treaties elsewhere, including in the Asian region. 
Of course, if the TPP's text largely converges around the practice of one of its 12 parties; that 
may be, to its critics, itself a problem insofar as it supports Benvenisti's "divide and conquer" 
hegemonic account.128 And, if what one expects from a "gold standard" is not just a treaty that 
reflects current trends but one that ends, for good, the second-guessing of host states' regulatory 
practices and does not provide foreign investors with any greater rights than those given to national 
investors, this is not such a treaty. 
Consider for example, the controversial arbitral award made in favour of the United States 
investor Bilcon in Bilcon v Canada, a NAFTA award of March 17, 2015.129 In that case, the 
majority – Bruno Simma J (formerly of the ICJ) and Professor Bryan Schwartz – over the dissent of 
Professor Donald McRae, ruled in favour of the mining company, which had been denied the right 
to engage in a quarry project in Nova Scotia after an environmental review by the federal and 
provincial authorities. The decision turned substantially on the interpretation of the FET provision in 
NAFTA, identified in the annex. The Tribunal agreed that this provision is identical to rights to the 
international minimum standard under customary international law but noted that, in accord with a 
number of prior NAFTA decisions, that standard has evolved over time so that it no longer requires 
proof of bad faith, wilful neglect of duty, or grossly unfair or a manifest or outrageous failure of 
justice, but could be triggered by violations of due process.130 In accord with the warnings against 
relying exclusively on the investors' legitimate expectations (that now appears in the TPP's FET 
clause as discussed) and that to the extent those expectations exist these must be based on specific 
  
126  At 13–16. 
127  At 19. 
128  See Benvenisti, above n 14.   
129  Bilcon v Canada (Jurisdiction and Liability) PCA 2009-04, 17 March 2015.  
130  At [433]–[454]. 
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representations by Canada on which the investor relied (see the language in CETA), the Tribunal 
concluded that it could still take into account the reasonable expectations of the investor that they 
would indeed be permitted to operate their quarry based on brochures and other statements by 
Canadian officials.131 The Tribunal found a violation of the FET provision based on the fact that the 
Canadian environmental review board relied on an unclear concept of "community core values" not 
specifically mentioned in Canadian law and departed from its usual procedure of suggesting 
mitigation procedures prior to issuing a final denial to a project.132 
Dissenting arbitrator McRae, a prominent Canadian academic in both trade and investment, 
argued that the actions of Nova Scotia officials in encouraging investment in mining were irrelevant 
to the alleged treaty violation, that consistency with community core values was indeed part of 
Canadian law and anticipated that the investor engage effectively in consultations with Aboriginal 
peoples, fishers and others in the affected community, and that the Tribunal's ruling otherwise 
appeared to be based simply on their view – right or not – that Canadian laws had not been properly 
applied despite the discretion normally accorded to the environmental review process.133 To McRae, 
the reviewers of the project took a principled position that was in accord with due process, with the 
socio-economic considerations that they were charged with considering, and which could not be 
seen as arbitrary, unfair or inequitable.134 McRae pointed out that by treating this as a treaty breach, 
the majority had introduced the potential for getting damages for action that under Canadian law 
does not provide a damages claim, thereby adding a further control over environmental review 
panels that does not exist under Canadian law.135 He suggested that the decision would change the 
character of environmental reviews in Canada, since these are generally made up of scientists and 
environmental experts and not lawyers attentive to the nuances in language that his arbitral 
colleagues apparently now expected.136 McRae concluded that:137 
… this is a significant intrusion into domestic jurisdiction and will create a chill on the operation of 
environmental review panels … [It] is not only an intrusion into the way an environmental review 
process is conducted, but also an intrusion into the environmental public policy of the state. 
  
131  At [455]–[474]. 
132  At [502]–[514], [530]–[543] and [546]–[547]. 
133  At [34] and [36]–[37] per Professor Donald McRae.  In this connection, note that the recently "scrubbed" 
text of CETA, as released in February 2016, after the Bilcom ruling, now includes a purported clarification 
("for greater certainty") indicating that "the fact that a measure breaches domestic law does not, in and of 
itself, establish a breach of [FET]": see Annex and CETA, above n 76, art 8.10(7). 
134  Bilcon v Canada, above n 129, at [38] and [50]–[51]. 
135  At [48]. 
136  At [46]–[48]. 
137  At [48]–[49].  
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As Lise Johnson and Lisa Sachs point out, there is nothing in the TPP's FET clause that would 
prevent another arbitral award like Bilcon.138 To such critics, the TPP's efforts to narrow the 
guarantees offered to investors, including FET, in response to 15 years of ISDS case law, does 
nothing to reduce the risks of arbitral second-guessing at odds with a state's ability to protect public 
values.139 It does not eliminate the possibility of arbitral reliance on state representations that were 
never intended to be legally binding and that would probably not be deemed relevant to resolve 
contractual disputes under national law. It does not eliminate resort to investor expectations and 
does not render more precise how egregious a violation of due process needs to be to violate FET or 
how much customary international law has evolved and what is relevant to making that judgment 
other than the decisions of prior arbitrators under BITs and FTAs.140 
Johnson and Sachs have a similar reaction to the other TPP efforts to re-calibrate the balance of 
investor and states' rights: art 9.16 does not, in their view, protect the states' right to regulate since 
all it does is clarify that states can take regulatory measures that are "otherwise consistent with the 
[investment] chapter".141 The TPP's provision that the claimant investor bears the burden of proof 
just recognises what is already the law; the rules on frivolous claims already appear in old treaties 
and do not fully protect states from such claims if arbitrators fail to use their powers; and its rule of 
law fixes of ISDS, nearly all familiar, do nothing to enable interested non-parties to intervene in 
these public interest cases, to provide the public with access to all relevant information – such as the 
settlements that states may enter into with investors in order to get rid of claims prior to an award – 
or to enable a real second look at erroneous arbitral awards through any provision for appellate 
review.142 The TPP, in short, does little in their view to protect against potential regulatory chilling 
effects. Johnson and Sachs conclude that the TPP:143 
  
138  Johnson and Sachs, above n 70, at 8–11 arguing that the TPP's efforts to clarify the concept of non-
discrimination would not prevent Bilcon-type rulings and the bringing of "speculative" claims. Although 
Johnson and Sachs address the national treatment guarantee of NAFTA, their conclusion applies equally 
with respect to the TPP's FET revised guarantee.   
139  Nor does the TPP ensure that investor claims will not challenge state measures of extraordinarily significant 
dimensions, such as a decision to eliminate its reliance on nuclear energy. See for example Nathalie 
Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Rhea Tamar Hoffmann "The German Nuclear Phase-Out Put to the Test in 
International Investment Arbitration? Background to the New Dispute Vattenfall v Germany (II), IISD" 
(June 2012) International Institute for Sustainable Development <www.iisd.org>.  
140  Johnson and Sachs suggest that a better result would have been to eliminate the FET guarantee altogether or 
to make it subject only to state to state but not investor-state adjudication: see Johnson and Sachs, above n 
70, at 6.  
141  At 2. 
142  At 4. 
143  At 19.  
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… represent[s] just small tweaks around the margins … At their core, ISDS and investor protections in 
treaties establish a privileged and powerful mechanism for foreign investors to bring claims against 
governments that fundamentally affect how domestic laws are developed, interpreted and applied, and 
sideline the roles of domestic individuals and institutions in shaping and applying public norms. For this 
reason, the TPP should drop ISDS altogether, or replace it with a new and truly reformed mechanism 
that addresses the myriad concerns that are still lurking in the TPP. 
As this suggests, those who were opposed to the TPP's investment chapter before it was made 
public are not likely to change their minds now that they have a final text.144 But what is that 
"reformed" mechanism that Johnson alludes to? The EU's recently tabled proposal for an 
international investment court in the ongoing TTIP negotiations (along with comparable provisions 
in the European Union–Vietnam FTA and CETA), constitutes the latest possible reform for those 
still searching for the gold standard.145  
The European Union's proposed dispute settlement system for the investment chapter of the 
TTIP would adopt many of the reformist measures already contained in the TPP (such as full 
transparency, a process for early dismissal of unfounded claims, and binding party interpretations) 
but crucially, would also establish a new international court system consisting of a Tribunal of First 
Instance (composed of 15 appointed judges) capped by an Appellate Tribunal (of six judges).146 The 
15 judges of the Tribunal of First Instance would be appointed jointly by the European Union and 
United States governments and be composed of five European Union nationals, five United States 
nationals, and five nationals of third countries. The Appellate Tribunal would be composed of two 
judges from the European Union and the United States respectively, along with an additional two 
from third countries. All 21 judges would be appointed for renewable six-year terms, be barred from 
taking on any work as legal counsel on any investment disputes, and would be subject to strict 
ethical rules to prevent conflicts of interest.147 They would be expected to be persons comparable to 
those suited to judicial offices with demonstrated expertise in public international law.148 Under the 
  
144  For a survey of evidence indicating that ten years after it was concluded, those who were for and against 
NAFTA's Investment Chapter appear not to have changed their minds about the wisdom of that treaty, see 
José E Alvarez "The NAFTA's Investment Chapter and Mexico" in Rudolf Dolzer, Matthias Herdegen and 
Bernhard Vogel (eds) Foreign Investment: Its Significance in Relation to the Fight Against Poverty, 
Economic Growth and Legal Culture (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Berlin, 2006) 241. 
145  European Commission "EU–Vietnam Free Trade Agreement: Agreed text as of January 2016" European 
Commission: Trade <www.trade.ec.europa.eu>; and CETA, above n 76. 
146  European Commission "Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Trade in Services, Investment and 
E-Commerce: Chapter 2 – Investment (draft text)", arts 18 (transparency), 16–17 (preliminary objections), 
13(5) (binding Committee interpretations) and 9–10 (establishing a Tribunal of First Instance and an Appeal 
Tribunal); and Draft TTIP text, above n 41.  
147  Articles 9–11. 
148  Articles 9(4) and 10(7). 
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envisioned system, the disputing parties would not choose their judges; their claims would be 
adjudicated by groups of three judges (one each from the European Union, the United States, and 
from third countries) appointed, on a rotational basis, by the Presidents of the Tribunal of First 
Instance and the Appeal Tribunal respectively.149  
The European Union proposal has been embraced by a number of scholars, including Robert 
Howse and Joost Pauwelyn.150 To proponents, replacing ISDS with an international investment 
court presents a commendable compromise between those who want no supranational review of host 
states that are charged with violating investors' rights and those who continue to embrace ISDS 
despite the sovereign backlash it has generated. ISDS, they claim, emerged largely by accident. It 
was the product of path dependency by those who were only familiar with arbitration as a method 
for settling inter-state disputes. If a system for adjudicating investment disputes had been designed 
today, it would have likely been inspired by today's "models of functioning transnational or 
international tribunals" instead.151 
The European Union proposal is clearly intended to correct the perceived rule of law flaws of 
ISDS. It responds to the fundamental lack of trust with respect to the relatively small pool of party 
appointed investor-state arbitrators, many of whom litigate investment claims themselves, on the 
side of the state or investor, when they are not asked to preside over them.152 Proponents of the 
investment court see it as resolving adverse perceptions of arbitrator conflicts of interest while 
ensuring that investment adjudicators do not think of themselves as partisan representatives for the 
party that appointed them to the dispute. Establishing a formal court will, it is said, enable and 
encourage the genuine reason-giving and coherent case law that the rule of law demands and that 
investors and states both expect, given the need for clarity and certainty with respect to the 
applicable rules.153 The Appellate Tribunal in particular is seen as ensuring greater coherency in 
investment law, while also providing, unlike the limited ICSID annulment process, the possibility 
for correcting erroneous interpretations of law or egregious errors in fact-finding. The European 
  
149  Articles 9(6)–(7) and 10(8)–(9).  
150  Robert Howse Courting the Critics of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: the EU proposal for a judicial 
system for investment disputes (2015) (unpublished manuscript; on file with author); and Joost Pauwelyn 
"Why the US Should Support the EU Proposal for an 'Investment Court System'" (16 November 2015) 
LinkedIn <www.linkedin.com>. 
151  Howse above n 150, at 7. See also Pauwelyn, above n 150, suggesting that the European Union proposal 
resembles the WTO's dispute settlement system, including its Appellate Body. 
152  For a critique of party-appointed investor-state arbitrators, see for example Hans Smit "The Pernicious 
Institution of the Party-Appointed Arbitrator" in Karl P Sauvant and Jennifer Reimer (eds) FDI 
Perspectives: Issues in International Investment (2nd ed, Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable 
Development, New York, 2012) 187. 
153  Compare Kingsbury and Schill, above n 52, urging greater attention to reason-giving within ISDS.  
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Union proposal is also praised for ensuring that those who adjudicate these public disputes have the 
needed expertise in public international law. Proponents also contend that since the European Union 
proposal imposes strict time limits on the processing of claims as well on limits on the ensuing 
costs, there would be substantial efficiency benefits – at least as compared to ISDS where the 
average award now takes 3 and a half years and $8 million to resolve.154 Finally, proponents of the 
European Union international investment court argue that it would replicate, for investment 
disputes, the WTO's successful dispute settlement scheme, which has brought rule of law without 
comparable sovereign backlash.155 
Whether the European Union proposal for an international investment court and comparable 
provisions now appearing elsewhere presents the future of the investment regime – whether it is the 
new gold standard for those looking for a form of supranational investment regulation that does not 
generate sovereign backlash – remains to be seen. While the proposal for an international 
investment court may indeed correct many (if not all)156 of the perceived rule of law flaws that now 
trouble critics of ISDS, it does not eliminate the fundamental risk that now drives critics of the 
investment regime: namely the risk that sovereign decisions in the public interest will be second-
guessed and chilled by the bringing of investor claims. Even if the envisioned investment court 
should come into being,157 there is nothing in the establishment of a permanent court, with or 
without an appellate body, that ensures that it will produce the types of sovereign-sensitive decisions 
that ISDS critics like Lise Johnson desire. The fact that under the European Union proposal two 
groups of judges will be in charge of interpreting the law does not mean that they will produce better 
  
154  Howse, above n 150, at 12-14. 
155  Pauwelyn, above n 150. See generally Joost Pauwelyn "The Rule of Law Without the Rule of Lawyers? 
Why Investment Arbitrators are from Mars, Trade Panelists are from Venus" (2015) 109 AJIL 761. 
156  Notably, the European Union proposal does not cure one ISDS flaw: the complaint that the fellow 
adjudicators are expected to decide on challenges to arbitrators: see Draft TTIP Text, above n 41, art 11(3) 
anticipating that the President of the Tribunal or of the Appeal Tribunal respectively will decide on 
challenges to judges. Interestingly, CETA's comparable provision anticipates that such challenges will be 
decided by the President of the International Court of Justice: see CETA, above n 76, at 8.30 (2)–(3). The 
European Union proposal also adds a rule of law problem of its own. It anticipates that the proposed 
investment court's awards will be enforced only as between the parties to the TTIP: see CETA, above n 76, 
art. 30. ICSID awards are, of course, enforceable as among all ICSID parties. 
157  Whether this occurs is not simply a matter of whether the EU's proposal is accepted by the United States and 
the TTIP is successfully concluded. It is not entirely clear whether the European Court of Justice will accept 
the existence of a "rival" body capable of interpreting European Union and international law: see Stephan 
Schill "The Proposed TTIP Tribunal and the Court of Justice: What Limits to Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement under EU Constitutional Law?" (29 September 2015) Verfassungblog <www.verfassungsblog.de>.  
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– or more sovereign sensitive – treaty interpretations. As a noted United States Supreme Court 
justice once remarked, appellate review does not ensure correctness; it only ensures finality.158 
Even if the European Union proposal will generate the appointment of judges with the kind of 
public international law expertise now associated with judges on the ICJ and the European Court of 
Human Rights, will those judges, faced with interpreting an investment protection treaty, be more 
likely to defer to sovereigns than today's ad hoc arbitrators? There is room for doubt on that score. 
The semi-permanent judges on an investment court, and especially those on the proposed Appeals 
Court, may be more, not less, empowered than an arbitrator appointed to a single case. Neither their 
status as semi-permanent judges of a formal court159 nor their envisioned expertise in public 
international law is necessarily likely to make them more deferential to states. Former ICJ judge 
Bruno Simma, a renowned expert on both public international law and human rights, was, after all, 
one of the two arbitrators writing the controversial (and singularly not deferential) majority opinion 
in the Bilcon case discussed above. Those who expect the envisioned international investment court 
to be more sympathetic to respondent states sued by investors may well be disappointed. 
We should be mindful that investment and human rights treaties share some commonalities. 
Both are designed to protect the rights to property, non-discrimination and fair process from state 
abuse. Neither the European Court of Human Rights nor the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
have been reticent about intruding into states' regulatory discretion. Both have seen their role as 
enforcers against the abuse of state power. Both of those permanent courts of public international 
law specialists have been criticised for not being sufficiently sensitive to the regulatory or security 
needs of states; both have generated their own measure of sovereign backlash. 
On the other hand, to the extent advocates for the new investment court predict that its judges 
will come to resemble those now serving on WTO panels and its Appellate Body, there is room to 
doubt whether that possibility will generate the level of legitimacy desired and emulate the relative 
success of the WTO dispute settlement system as Pauwelyn suggests. As Pauwelyn has 
demonstrated, those who now serve as WTO adjudicators tend to come disproportionately from 
WTO governments, including trade ministries.160 It seems appropriate to turn to government 
functionaries – often former trade officials – to resolve trade disputes that trade ministers bring 
against one another. But investor-state claims are not between governments. The networks of 
international investor protection treaties have generated expectations that they are intended to 
  
158  "We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible because we are final": Brown v Allen 344 
US 443, (1953) at 540 per Jackson J. 
159  The "semi-permanent" status of the proposed international investment court of the TTIP is suggested by the 
fact that its envisioned judges are not engaged as such permanently but only receive a monthly retainer fee 
to ensure their availability as disputes and appeals arise; in addition, certain administrative and legal 
secretariat services are outsourced to ICSID: see Draft TTIP Text, above n 41, arts 9-10. 
160  Pauwelyn, above n 150. 
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protect private third party beneficiaries and not only states' regulatory prerogatives.161 Whether 
government functionaries will satisfy these rule of law expectations and credibly preside over 
disputes between private investors and governments remains an open question. 
The turn to ad hoc arbitration to revolve investor-state disputes may not have been entirely a 
historical accident or the unintended product of path dependency in favour of arbitration as has been 
suggested. ISDS itself is a compromise. Enabling both investors and respondent states to appoint 
their own respective arbitrators strikes a balance between likely biases on either side. It also enables 
private parties to feel a certain degree of party ownership and control over an adjudicative process 
that would otherwise be totally within the control of the states that they are suing.162 Of course, 
even if only an irrational default penchant for arbitration explains the rise and continued reliance on 
investor-state arbitration, it remains unclear whether those who have long been accustomed to 
exercising discretion on all the matters governing their dispute – from the appointment of arbitrators 
to the selection of arbitral rules and institutions – are ready to give all of that up for the untested 
merits of a single international investment court whose judges, rules and procedures have all been 
fashioned by the prospective respondent states – and over which governments will continue to assert 
interpretative control through the issuance of binding interpretations. As the chequered history (and 
still underutilised jurisdiction) of the ICJ suggests, even permanent courts with considerable 
legitimacy need to attract (and retain) their litigants. The European Union's international investment 
court may be an impressive rule of law achievement on paper, but one that, should it fail to secure 
the confidence of investors or states or both, may be left high and dry as its prospective litigants 
contract around it.  
Some might question whether, for other reasons, the European Union's proposed investment 
court is a realistic gold standard. While that court may be popular with some scholars, the jury is out 
on whether it will be popular with governments outside Europe. Realists might point out that that 
the United States government (and most of Asia's governments) do not do international courts. 
While the recent FTA between the European Union and Vietnam suggests that some Asian states 
may yet change their minds on that score,163 the United States (and its Congress) is not likely to 
acquiesce in the European Union's proposal for an international investment court in the TTIP and 
some suspect that the European Union knows this all too well and is making the proposal for 
domestic consumption – to show those clamouring for a formal court that it tried and failed. Despite 
the displacement of ISDS in the European Union–Vietnam and CETA agreements, the prospect that 
  
161  Compare Jeremy Waldron "Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefits of the International Rule of Law?" 
(2011) 22 EJIL 315 (questioning whether the international rule of law requires protecting the rights of 
sovereigns as sovereigns).  
162  See generally Sophie Nappert "Escaping from Freedom? The Dilemma of an Improved ISDS Mechanism" 
(EFILA Annual Lecture, London, 26 November 2015). 
163  "EU–Vietnam Free Trade Agreement", above n 145.   
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the TPP will be re-opened to replace ISDS with an international investment court seems unlikely 
unless the United States changes its posture in favour of ISDS.164 Such a change would also require 
quite a change in the attitudes of many of the other TPP parties. There is no Asian court of human 
rights, after all, and it seems odd that the first such international court in the region would be one 
designed to protect only those persons with capital, namely investors.165   
CONCLUSION 
Those looking for the motivations of New Zealand's government when it entered into the TPP 
negotiations need look no further than the words of Alfred Lord Tennyson emblazoned on a wall in 
the international terminal of Auckland's airport:166 
For I dipt into the future, far as human eye could see, Saw the vision of the world, and all the wonder 
that would be; Saw the heavens fill with commerce, argosies of magic sails, Pilots of the purple twilight 
dropping down with costly bales …   
At the risk of over simplification, New Zealand's current officials saw the investment chapter as 
the necessary price to be paid for the treaty's proffered gateway for new markets for New Zealand 
exports. Their vision of "heavens filled with commerce" led to the government's (perhaps reluctant) 
embrace of the TPP's investment chapter and ISDS.  
The TPP's investment chapter pursues a reform path within the existing international investment 
regime that many other states, including the United States, support. Benvenisti and Kelsey 
emphasise that it is a path forged by the exercise of asymmetrical power among nations in which, as 
Kelsey states, "the world's declining but still powerful superpowers are trying to consolidate new 
global rules that entrench and advance their economic interests".167 But the fact that mega-regionals 
like the TPP may advance the economic and security interests of hegemons does not mean that, on 
balance, they may not also advance the interests of even small states like New Zealand. Most 
treaties – and indeed perhaps most of customary international law – have been the product of 
exercises of asymmetric power games. Unless we presume that the underlying games being played 
  
164  Under the TPP's current provisions, it is more likely that its provisions for dispute settlement could be 
modified only by adding an appellate mechanism: see TPP, above n 3, art 9.23.11 providing that "[i]n the 
event that an appellate mechanism for reviewing awards rendered by investor-State dispute settlement 
tribunals is developed in the future under other institutional arrangements, the Parties shall consider whether 
awards rendered under Article 9.29 (Awards) should be subject to that appellate mechanism".  
165  Nor is the rather cynical Pauwelyn idea – that the European Union should just call for the establishment of 
WTO-like "panels" and an "appellate body" filled with "panelists" and not "judges" – likely to fool anyone 
who is adverse to permanent bodies of empowered individuals over the state even if appointed by the state: 
see Pauwelyn, above n 150. 
166  Lord Alfred Tennyson Locksley Hall (1842). 
167  Kelsey, above n 37.  
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are zero-sum, this alone may not tell us that agreeing to the rules such negotiations produce are 
unwise for weaker negotiating parties. The TPP is made up of package deals of no less consequence 
than in the Law of the Sea Convention or on-going efforts to control climate change. It incorporates 
trade-offs between regulatory discretion and the benefits anticipated for trade in goods and global 
value chains. These trade-offs merit sober reflection. 
Those examining whether the trade-offs embedded in the current text of the TPP's investment 
chapter are, on balance, of net benefit to New Zealand need to take into account likely alternatives. 
One alternative is suggested by those that seek to exit the investment regime (like Ecuador). That 
path is marked by a purported search for renewed forms of regional autonomy, self-determination, 
and more egalitarian forms of economic exchange. That path is less predictable in terms of long-
term political, economic and security benefits, has uncertain support even from presumptive allies 
like Cuba, and may generate, in the worst case scenario, renewed turns to unilateral forms of self-
help common to the pre-BIT world – or other, less lawyerly, ways to resolve investment disputes. A 
third, more radical reformist path is suggested by the European Union's proposed international 
investment court. This vision is built on a very European craving for international courts and a 
particular progress narrative for how best to generate and sustain the global rule of law. 
We should not mistake these three possible routes to achieving the gold standard for the "end of 
history".168 Further pragmatic compromises among the three alternatives above are not only 
possible but likely. These may include, for example, continued reliance on ISDS, but the 
incorporation of an appellate mechanism.169 Even in the face of the competing European Union and 
United States visions for the future of the investment regime, countries like Brazil (that have 
remained outside ISDS) are attempting to carve out other alternatives, including a return to state-to-
state arbitration.170 Only those whose imaginations are limited to trans-Atlantic developments are 
likely to suggest that the only choices are either the United States' – marked by the TPP – or the 
European Union's – and that any other possibilities are but futile efforts to find the Holy Grail.   
  
  
168  See generally Francis Fukuyama The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, New York, 1992). 
169  See for example Stephan Schill "Editorial: US Versus EU Leadership in Global Investment Governance" 
(2016) 17 Journal of World Investment & Trade 1 at 2. For other possibilities see for example United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International 
Investment Governance (United Nations, Geneva, 2015) at ch IV: Reforming the International Investment 
Regime: An Action Menu.  
170  Joaquim de Paiva Muniz and Luis Peretti "Brazil Signs New Bilateral Investment Treaties with 
Mozambique and Angola: New Approach to BITs or 'Toothless Lions'?" (17 April 2015) Global Arbitration 
News <www.globalarbitrationnews.com>.  
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ANNEX 
United States-Argentina BIT (based on the United States Model BIT of 
1987): 
Investment shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full protection 
and security and shall in no case be accorded treatment less than that required by international law. 
Neither Party shall in any way impair by arbitrary and discriminatory measures the management, 
operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, acquisition, expansion, or disposal of investments . . . Each 
party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments. 
Argentina-Australia BIT (1995): 
Each Contracting Party shall at all times ensure fair and equitable treatment to investments. 
NAFTA (1994), Article 1105 (1): 
Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party in accordance with 
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security. 
NAFTA, The 31 July 2001 Free Trade Commission Interpretation: 
(1)  Article 1105 (1) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to investment of 
investors of another Party. 
(2)  The concepts of 'fair and equitable treatment' and 'full protection and security' do not 
require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.  
(3)  A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of the NAFTA, or of a 
separate international agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of Article 
1105(1). 
United States 2004 Model BIT: 
Article 5: Minimum Standard of Treatment171 
(1) Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with customary 
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security 
(2) For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international law minimum 
standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard to be afforded to covered 
investments. The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and 
  
171  Article 5 [Minimum Standard of Treatment] shall be interpreted in accordance with Annex A. 
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security" do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by that 
standard, and do not create additional substantive rights. The obligation in paragraph 1 to 
provide:  
(1) "fair and equitable treatment" includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, 
civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of 
due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world; 
(2) "full protection and security" requires each party to provide the level of police 
protection required under customary international law.  
(3) A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of this Treaty, or of a 
separate international agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of this 
Article.  
ANNEX A 
Customary International Law 
The parties confirm their shared understanding that "customary international law" generally and 
as specifically referenced in Article 5 [Minimum Standard of Treatment] and Annex B 
[Expropriation] results from a general and consistent practice of States that they follow from a sense 
of legal obligation. With regard to Article 5 [Minimum Standard of Treatment], the customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens refers to all customary international law 
principles that protect the economic rights and interests of aliens. 
Canada-European Union: Comprehensive economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) (2016) 
Chapter Eight: Investment 
Section D: Investment Protection 
Article 8.10: Treatment of Investors and of Covered Investments 
(1) Each Party shall accord in its territory to covered investments of the other Party and to 
Investors with respect to their covered investments fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security in accordance with paragraphs 2 to 6.  
(2) A Party breaches the obligation of fair and equitable treatment referenced in paragraph 1 
where a measure or series of measures constitutes: 
(a) denial of justice in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; 
(b) fundamental breach of due process, including a fundamental breach of transparency, 
in judicial and administrative proceedings; 
(c) manifest arbitrariness; 
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(d) targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such as gender, race or 
religious belief; 
(e) abusive treatment of investors, such as coercion, duress and harassment; or  
(f) a breach of any further elements of the fair and equitable treatment obligation adopted 
by the Parties in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article. 
(3) The Parties shall regularly, or upon request of a Party, review the content of the obligation 
to provide fair and equitable treatment. The Committee on Services and Investment, 
established under Article 26.2.1(b) (Specialised committees), may develop 
recommendations in this regard and submit them to the CETA Joint Committee for 
decision. 
(4) When applying the above fair and equitable treatment obligation, a tribunal may take into 
account whether a Party made a specific representation to an investor to induce a covered 
investment, that created a legitimate expectation, and upon which the investor relied in 
deciding to make or maintain the covered investment, but that the Party subsequently 
frustrated.  
(5) For greater certainty, 'full protection and security' refers to the party's obligations relating to 
physical security of investors and covered investments. 
(6) For greater certainty, a breach of another provision of this Agreement, or of a separate 
international Agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of this Article. 
(7) For greater certainty, the fact that a measure breaches domestic law does not, in and of 
itself, establish a breach of this Article. In order to ascertain whether the measure breaches 
this Article, a Tribunal must consider whether a party has acted inconsistently with the 
obligations in paragraph 1. 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (2015) 
Article 9.6: Minimum Standard of Treatment [15] 
(1) Each party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with applicable 
customary international law principles, including fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security 
(2) For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international law minimum 
standard of treatment of aliens as the standard of treatment to be afforded to covered 
investments. The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and 
security" do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by that 
standard, and do not create additional substantive rights. The obligations in paragraph 1 to 
provide: 
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(a) "fair and equitable treatment" includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, 
civil or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of 
due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world; and 
(b) "full protection and security" requires each Party to provide the level of police 
protection required under customary international law. 
(3) A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of this Agreement, or of a 
separate international agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of this 
Article. 
(4) For greater certainty, the mere fact that a Party takes or fails to take an action that may be 
inconsistent with an investor's expectations does not constitute a breach of this Article, 
even if there is loss or damage to the covered investment as a result.  
[15] Article 9.6 (Minimum Standard of Treatment) shall be interpreted in accordance with 
Annex 9-A (Customary International Law) 
Annex 9-A Customary International Law 
The Parties confirm their shared understanding that "customary international law" generally and 
as specifically referenced in Article 9.6 (Minimum Standard of Treatment) results from a general 
and consistent practice of States that they follow from a sense of legal obligation. The customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens refers to all customary international law 
principles that protect the investments of aliens. 
 
 
 
 
